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EVEN BETTER THAN THE REAL THING: HOW COURTS HAVE
BEEN ANYTHING BUT LIBERAL IN FINDING GENUINE
QUESTIONS RAISED AS TO THE AUTHENTICITY OF
ORIGINALS UNDER RULE 1003
COLIN MILLER*
The year is 1814. A man claiming that he owns property in Connecticut brings a lawsuit to eject an alleged squatter on his land.1 The
man can neither locate the original deed establishing his title to the
property, nor account for its nonproduction, but he instead produces
a certified copy of the deed, which was “regularly recorded in the
town clerk’s office, agreeably to the laws of th[e] state . . . .”2 The
Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut determines that the trial
court properly rejected the copy, finding that a party seeking to establish and enforce property rights “is of course bound to produce the
original deed, or sh[o]w some reason for not producing it.”3 Courts
across the country render similar decisions when parties unable to account for the nonproduction of originals attempt to prove the contents of grants,4 letters,5 contracts,6 and other written documents
through copies or testimony, pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule,
which seeks to ensure that a party’s substantive rights are not affected
by the possibility of fraud and the errors of human transcription and
memory attendant in copies and testimony about the contents of
documents.7
Copyright  2008 by Colin Miller.
* Assistant Professor, The John Marshall Law School, Chicago, Illinois; Blog Editor,
EvidenceProf Blog: http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/evidenceprof/. I would like to
thank Professor Aviva Orenstein for her helpful suggestions on this Article, my wife Zoe for
her support and assistance with this Article, and Joshua Bedwell for his research assistance.
1. Cunningham v. Tracy, 1 Conn. 252, 253 (1814).
2. Id.
3. Id. at 254–54a.
4. See, e.g., Malcolmson v. McKee, 3 S.C.L. (1 Brev.) 168 (1802) (affirming the trial
court’s decision to exclude the copy of a grant, certified by the Secretary of State to be a
true copy, because the proponent could not account for his nonproduction of the
original).
5. See, e.g., Murphy v. McNiel, 19 N.C. (2 Dev. & Bat.) 244, 245–46 (1837) (affirming
the trial court’s decision to exclude the sworn copy of a letter because the plaintiff did not
show that it was out of his power to produce the original).
6. See, e.g., Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 300 (1860) (“The exhibit marked ‘B,’ being a
copy of the original contract, the non-production of which was not sufficiently accounted
for, was improperly admitted.”).
7. See infra note 45 and accompanying text.
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The year is 2005. Ayman Amin, an Egyptian national living in the
United States since 1996, is the Assistant General Manager at a Hampton Inn operated by Flagstone Hospitality Management, L.L.C., and
Monica Jenkins is the General Manager.8 In February, with Hampton
Inn Chief Engineer Sulayman N’jie present, Jenkins gives Amin a disciplinary write-up based upon alleged insubordination.9 Jenkins
claims that Amin was verbally abusive to her, and Amin counters that
Jenkins was rude and made racist remarks to him.10 During the next
ten days, Amin files a discrimination complaint with the Minnesota
Department of Human Rights; Amin informs Jenkins of the complaint; Amin meets with Jenkins, N’jie, and Flagstone’s Regional Manager Mark Kucera; and Kucera fires Amin.11
Amin thereafter sues Flagstone, asserting, inter alia, retaliation
under Minnesota’s Whistleblower Act, and discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the Minnesota Human Rights Act.12 In its
defense, Flagstone submits a copy of a declaration by Kucera with a
copy of N’jie’s typewritten and signed declaration attached to it; Flagstone neither produces the original of either document nor justifies
their nonproduction.13 During N’jie’s deposition, he “testifie[s] that
he never typed his [declaration], nor did he sign any typed statement.
He denie[s] writing the substance of the statement, and agree[s] that
while some of the statement was true, many things were taken out of
context.”14 The final page of the copy of Kucera’s declaration “has
printing across the top indicative of a fax, and the remainder of the
document does not.”15
The court finds both of the copies admissible pursuant to Federal
Rule of Evidence 1003, an exception to the Best Evidence Rule.16 Enacted in 1975, and thereafter incorporated into most states’ rules of
evidence,17 Rule 1003 indicates that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the
same extent as an original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to
the authenticity of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be
unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original.”18 Of the two, the
8. Amin v. Flagstone Hospitality Mgmt., LLC, No. 03-1181 (JRT/JSM), 2005 WL
3054599, at *1 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2005).
9. Id. at *2.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. at *1.
13. Id. at *3.
14. Id.
15. Id. at *5.
16. Id.
17. See, e.g., N.J. R. EVID. 1003.
18. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
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exception contained in subsection (2) “is more obscure,”19 and yet
courts have created and fairly applied a test to determine whether the
opponent of a duplicate has established that it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the original. Under this exception, courts
consistently find that a duplicate is inadmissible when the proponent
offers a duplicate that fails to reproduce important or critical parts of
an original, and the opponent establishes that the remainder is
needed for some purpose such as cross-examination.20
Conversely, when, as in Amin’s case, the party opposing the admission of a duplicate contends that there is a genuine question as to
the authenticity of the original, courts consistently reject the claim,
whether the contested evidence is a deed,21 grant,22 letter,23 contract,24 photograph,25 audio tape,26 or digital recording.27 Indeed,
“[a]lmost all of the reported cases which address complaints that a
duplicate was admitted over an objection asserting the existence of a
genuine question of authenticity reject the claim.”28 Since the enactment of Rule 1003, “duplicates are more often admitted into evidence
than originals,”29 meaning that such rulings affect a significant number of litigants.
This Article contends that courts have both failed to adopt a consistent approach to Rule 1003(1) challenges and that the scattershot
approach that they have taken has resulted in an improperly narrow
construction and application of the exception. It argues that courts
19. Olin Guy Wellborn III, The “Best Evidence” Article of the Texas Rules of Evidence, 18 ST.
MARY’S L.J. 99, 116 (1986).
20. See infra notes 102–103 and accompanying text.
21. See, e.g., United States v. Walls, 577 F.2d 690, 699 (9th Cir. 1978) (finding that a
quitclaim deed was properly admitted because there was no genuine question raised as to
the authenticity of the original).
22. See, e.g., United States v. Fink, No. CIV 04-4130, 2007 WL 4287648, at *3–*4 (D.S.D.
Nov. 30, 2007) (rejecting the defendant’s challenge to a copy of a grant deed under Rule
1003(1)).
23. See, e.g., Dietrich v. Bauer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763–64 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (rejecting
Dietrich’s Rule 1003(1) argument that a copy of a letter dated January 4, 1991, was inauthentic, despite forensic expert testimony that the original was not created on that date).
24. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 11 P.3d 20, 24–25 (Idaho 2000) (admitting a copy of a
memorandum agreement despite a witness’s testimony that the items in the document had
been altered).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Stockton, 968 F.2d 715, 719 (8th Cir. 1992) (admitting a
copy of a photograph over defendant’s objection).
26. See, e.g., Smith v. City of Chicago, 242 F.3d 737, 741–42 (7th Cir. 2001) (admitting a
copy of an audio tape over a plaintiff’s Rule 1003(1) objection).
27. See, e.g., United States v. Savarese, 404 F.3d 651, 656 (2d Cir. 2005) (admitting a
copy of a digital recording over a defendant’s Rule 1003(1) objection).
28. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 114.
29. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 576 (D. Md. 2007).
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should instead determine whether parties opposing the admission of
duplicates raise genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals
by applying the same test that they use to determine whether parties
opposing motions for summary judgment raise genuine issues of fact
for trial.
Part I looks at how and why courts adopted the Best Evidence
Rule starting in 1700 and how they applied it to exclude any secondary evidence when the proponent sought to prove the contents of a
writing but could not explain his nonproduction of the original. It
then explains how states in the twentieth century began loosening the
Best Evidence Rule with the advent of technologies that ostensibly allowed for copies to be produced without the possibility of error inherent in human transcription. Part I concludes with a look at Article X
of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which, inter alia, codified the emerging state trend of finding copies produced without human transcription to be admissible even without proponents accounting for
nonproduction of originals.
Part II contends that Federal Rule of Evidence 1003(1) and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) have similar language in that
the former states that a duplicate is not admissible to the same extent
as an original when there is a genuine question raised as to the authenticity of the original, while the latter indicates that a party opposing a
motion for summary judgment must raise a genuine issue for trial. It
argues that, despite (1) the rule of construction that federal rules are
to be taken according to their natural meaning, (2) the consistent
conflation of the phrases “genuine question” and “genuine issue” in
case law, and (3) precedent giving the same effect to similar phrases
in other Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, courts have required a greater evidentiary showing by parties
opposing the admission of duplicates than they require of parties opposing motions for summary judgment. Accordingly, Part II concludes that courts should find that parties opposing the admission of
duplicates raise genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals
under the same circumstances in which they find that parties opposing motions for summary judgment raise genuine issues of fact for
trial.
Part III claims that the legislative history of Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 provides an even stronger basis for the argument that
courts should treat parties opposing the admission of duplicates
under Rule 1003(1) in the same manner that they treat parties opposing motions for summary judgment. It notes that (1) the House Committee on the Judiciary approved Rule 1003 “with the expectation that

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr103.txt

164

unknown

Seq: 5

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:42

[VOL. 68:160

the courts would be liberal in deciding that a ‘genuine question is
raised as to the authenticity of the original’”;30 (2) Edward Cleary, the
Chief Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of
Evidence, claimed that “[t]he party complaining of lack of opportunity to see the original would, in my opinion, find in the exceptions of
Rule 1003 any protection which the circumstances justified”;31 and (3)
the first case cited in the Advisory Committee’s Note to Proposed Rule
1003 was a case where an appellate court affirmed a trial court’s decision that a duplicate was admissible but cautioned that the trial judge
would have taken “appropriate action” had opposing counsel “made
the slightest suggestion that the photostats offered in evidence were
incorrect.”32 This Part notes, however, that courts have been anything
but liberal in finding genuine questions raised as to the authenticity of
originals, almost never granting evidentiary challenges made under
Rule 1003(1). Instead, courts have given an improperly narrow construction and application to the exception, in effect rendering it
meaningless.
Part IV contends that technological developments since Rule
1003’s enactment provide another basis for using the summary judgment test in Rule 1003(1) cases. It notes that, although the legal community thought in 1975 that modern copying technologies eliminated
the possibility of human transcription errors and largely obviated concerns about fraud in the duplication process, there is a growing recognition of the ease with which material can be quickly and convincingly
manipulated by nearly anyone. And yet, while these concerns have
found voice in digital forensics scholarship, the Department of Justice,
and even popular fiction, they have not yet led judges to give increased credence to Rule 1003(1) objections. Finally, the Article concludes that these factors have made duplicates even better than the
real thing because they are largely treated the same as originals for
authentication purposes, and yet originals may possess physical characteristics of the highest importance that no copying process can
reproduce.

30. FED. R. EVID. 1003 advisory committee’s note.
31. Letter from Professor Edward W. Cleary to Herbert E. Hoffman, Esq. (May 15,
1973) [hereinafter Cleary Letter], in Proposed Rules of Evidence (supplement): Hearings on Proposed Rules of Evidence Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Justice of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
93rd Cong. 83–84 (1973) [hereinafter Hearings].
32. Myrick v. United States, 332 F.2d 279, 282 (5th Cir. 1964).
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A. The “Medieval Mind” and the Origins of the Best Evidence Rule
Pre-Roman inhabitants of England, who were mostly illiterate,
placed great importance on ceremony and “viewed written documents
affecting property or contractual rights not as mere indicia of those
rights, but as the rights themselves.”33 While this mindset, dubbed the
“medieval mind” by Wigmore,34 eventually dissipated before disappearing entirely in the early 1800s, it permeated evidence law, setting
the stage for both the doctrine of profert in curia and the Best Evidence
Rule.35 In courts of law, the ancient pleading doctrine of profert in
curia required a party seeking relief based upon a written instrument
to allege that he could produce the original.36 If a party could not
produce the original document when its contents were at issue, he
literally lost the rights it allegedly created.37
Closely related to the doctrine of profert in curia is the Best Evidence Rule,38 also known as the Original Document Rule.39 Under
the Best Evidence Rule, first enunciated in Ford v. Hopkins40 in 1700,
the proponent of evidence concerning the contents of a written document had to produce the original document or account for its nonproduction.41 If the proponent could neither produce the original
document nor provide a satisfactory reason for its nonproduction, he
could not prove the contents of the document through secondary evi33. Cynthia A. De Silva, California’s Best Evidence Rule Repeal: Toward a Greater Appreciation for Secondary Evidence, 30 MCGEORGE L. REV. 646, 648 (1999).
34. 4 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1177, at 406
(Chadbourn rev. 1972).
35. John Robinson Thomas, Note, Legal Responses to Commercial Transactions Employing
Novel Communications Media, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1145, 1166 (1992).
36. Twp. of Haddon v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am., 929 F. Supp. 774, 779 & n.3 (D.N.J. 1996).
Courts of law required plaintiffs to “make” profert in curia, which meant that the plaintiff
had to insert the words “profert in curia” in “a declaration as an allegation that [he] was
ready to produce, or did produce in court, the written instrument on which the suit was
founded.” Id. (citation omitted).
37. Id. at 779.
38. Thomas, supra note 35, at 1166.
39. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Jury-Dependence of Evidence Law, 155 U. PA. L.
REV. 165, 177 (2006).
40. (1700) 91 Eng. Rep. 250, 250–51 (K.B.).
41. See Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Meaning of Probative Value and Prejudice in Federal
Rule of Evidence 403: Can Rule 403 Be Used to Resurrect the Common Law of Evidence?, 41 VAND.
L. REV. 879, 880 (1988) (“The common law [best evidence rule] enforces this preference
by excluding other evidence of the document’s contents, such as oral testimony describing
the document, unless there is an adequate excuse for the nonproduction of the
document.”).
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dence such as witness testimony42 or a handwritten copy.43 Courts applied this Best Evidence Rule with an understanding of the central
position that the written word occupies in the law and the knowledge
that “a slight variation of words may mean a great difference in
rights.”44 The requirement that the proponent of a document produce an original or account for its nonproduction was thus an effort
to ensure that a party’s substantive rights were not affected by the possibility of fraud or errors of human transcription and memory attendant in handwritten copies and testimony.45
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence and the “Duplicate” Exception
The twentieth century witnessed the invention of new technologies, such as the process of xerography, invented by attorney Chester
Carlson in 1937, which “revolutionize[d] the document reproduction
industry”46 because originals could be ostensibly reproduced without
the errors inherent in human transcription.47 In response to these
new technologies, states began enacting exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule that allowed for the admission of “duplicates” or “duplicate originals” created without manual transcription even when
proponents could not account for the nonproduction of originals.48
These changes paved the way for the eventual adoption of Article X,
and specifically Rule 1003, of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.
Before discussing Article X, however, a brief discussion of the rules of
authentication under Article IX is necessary.
42. See, e.g., Auten v. Jacobus, 47 N.Y.S. 1119, 1121 (N.Y. App. Term 1897) (affirming
the trial court’s exclusion of the defendant’s testimony about the contents of a letter when
the defendant did not explain his nonproduction of the original letter at trial).
43. See, e.g., Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 282, 300 (1860) (rejecting a handwritten copy of
a contract when the proponent did not sufficiently account for his nonproduction of the
original).
44. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 231, at 704 (Edward W. Cleary ed., 3d ed. 1984).
45. See Williams v. United States, 3 F.2d 129, 134 (8th Cir. 1924) (“The rule requiring
record evidence, or the best evidence of which a case in its nature is susceptible, is to
prevent fraud, and reduce possibility of error to a minimum.”); De Silva, supra note 33, at
651–52 (“Therefore, many courts and scholars consider the accurate representation of the
original text to be the fundamental policy underlying the rule, as introduction of the original can ensure that errors in transcription and foggy memories of the writing’s contents
will not affect a party’s substantive rights.”).
46. SCM Corp. v. Xerox Corp., 645 F.2d 1195, 1197 (2d Cir. 1981).
47. When the Supreme Court initially proposed Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972, the Advisory Committee included a note to Rule 1001, which indicated that
duplicates such as photocopies were largely treated like originals pursuant to Rule 1003
because they were “produced by methods possessing an accuracy which virtually eliminates
the possibility of error.” FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee’s note.
48. See, e.g., Wellborn, supra note 19, at 113 (noting that Texas allowed for the admission of such duplicates starting in 1959).
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1. Article IX: Authentication
As a general rule, before a party can introduce tangible evidence
at a trial or hearing, the party must properly authenticate or identify
the evidence in accordance with Article IX of the Federal Rules of
Evidence or state counterparts.49 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(a) and most state equivalents, “[t]he requirement of authentication or identification as a condition precedent to admissibility
is satisfied by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter
in question is what its proponent claims.”50 In other words, pursuant
to the guidance of the Advisory Committee’s notes, courts have
treated preliminary questions of authenticity and identification as
matters of conditional relevance according to the standards of Federal
Rule of Evidence 104(b).51
Once a court determines that a party has satisfied Rule 901(a)’s
liberal52 test for authenticating a piece of evidence, any challenges
that the opposing party has with regard to its authenticity “go to the
weight of the evidence—not to its admissibility.”53 Thus, for instance, if
the proponent of a document properly authenticates it, and the opposing party has significant evidence that the document is a forgery,
the document will be submitted to the jury based upon the proponent’s authentication, with the jury using the opposing party’s evidence merely to determine how much weight or significance to afford
the document.54
Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b) sets out a list of ten specific ways
in which the proponent can authenticate a tangible piece of evidence.55 For example, a plaintiff could authenticate a letter allegedly
written by the defendant by testifying that he saw the defendant write
the letter,56 having a lay witness familiar with the defendant’s handwriting testify that the letter appeared to be written by the defen49. United States v. Lawson, 494 F.3d 1046, 1052 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
50. FED. R. EVID. 901(a).
51. See FED. R. EVID. 901 advisory committee’s note (“This requirement of showing authenticity or identity falls in the category of relevancy dependent upon fulfillment of a
condition of fact and is governed by the procedure set forth in Rule 104(b).”).
52. See, e.g., Sewell v. State, 721 So. 2d 129, 140 (Miss. 1998) (“[T]he state cites a liberal
preference for admission of evidence as the approach for authentication and identification
under Rule 901(a) on the federal level, after which our rule is patterned.”).
53. United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Koziy, 728 F.2d 1314, 1322 (11th Cir. 1984) (“Whether or
not the . . . abmeldung were forgeries fails to go to their admissibility, but rather to the
weight of the evidence.”).
55. FED. R. EVID. 901(b).
56. Id. 901(b)(1).
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dant,57 or having either a handwriting expert or the jury compare the
letter with a handwriting exemplar submitted by the defendant.58
This list, however, is non-exhaustive, and courts have repeatedly found
that parties can authenticate tangible evidence through methods not
listed in Rule 901(b) as long as those methods meet the liberal standard set out in Rule 901(a).59 Furthermore, Federal Rule of Evidence
902 lists twelve types of self-authenticating documents, such as certified copies of public records,60 official publications,61 and acknowledged documents.62 Documents listed under Rule 902 do not need to
be authenticated through extrinsic evidence.63
2. Article X: The Modern Best Evidence Rule
Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which consists of
Rules 1001–1008, contains the modern Best Evidence Rule. Most
states have modified their Best Evidence Rules to conform to the federal counterpart.64
a. Rule 1002: The Rule’s Scope
Federal Rule of Evidence 1002 sets forth the general Best Evidence Rule: “To prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph, the original writing, recording, or photograph is required,
except as otherwise provided in these rules or by Act of Congress.”65
Thus, the Best Evidence Rule is inapplicable when a party seeks to
admit evidence or testimony which relates to a writing, recording, or
photograph, but does not seek to prove its contents.66 For example,
in State v. Clark,67 the defendant allegedly murdered her husband, and
the trial court allowed a witness to testify that she discovered a life
insurance policy on the husband’s life in the defendant’s personal be57. Id. 901(b)(2).
58. Id. 901(b)(3).
59. See United States v. Simpson, 152 F.3d 1241, 1249–50 (10th Cir. 1998) (“The specific examples of authentication referred to by Simpson are merely illustrative, however,
and are not intended as an exclusive enumeration of allowable methods of authentication.
Rather, all that is ultimately required is evidence sufficient to support a finding that the
matter in question is what its proponent claims.”) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted).
60. FED. R. EVID. 902(4).
61. Id. 902(5).
62. Id. 902(8).
63. Id. 902.
64. See, e.g., N.J. R. EVID. 1001–08.
65. FED. R. EVID. 1002.
66. See id.
67. 377 S.E.2d 54 (N.C. 1989).
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longings, even though the prosecution did not produce the original
policy.68 On the defendant’s appeal, the Supreme Court of North
Carolina affirmed the trial court’s finding of first degree murder, stating that the witness’s testimony “was offered not to prove contents or
terms, but simply to show defendant’s knowledge that the policy
existed.”69
Furthermore, “[t]he best-evidence rule does not apply where a
party seeks to prove a fact which has an existence independent of any
writing, even though the fact might have been reduced to, or is evidenced by, a writing.”70 Thus, in JAG Consulting v. Eubanks, an appellate court found, in a shop owner’s lawsuit for conversion of his tools
and equipment, that the trial court properly allowed his wife to testify
about his lost income resulting from the conversion because she had
personal knowledge of the lost income.71 The fact that the wife later
used this knowledge to prepare his tax returns did not make her testimony inadmissible pursuant to the Best Evidence Rule, even though
the plaintiff did not produce the tax returns at trial.72
b. Rule 1001: Defining the Relevant Terms
Meanwhile, Federal Rule of Evidence 1001 defines the relevant
terms contained in Rule 1002 and sets forth the definition of a “duplicate” as used in Rule 1003. According to Rule 1001(1), “‘[w]ritings’
and ‘recordings’ consist of letters, words, or numbers, or their
equivalent, set down by handwriting, typewriting, printing, photostating, photographing, magnetic impulse, mechanical or electronic recording, or other form of data compilation.”73 Under this definition,
the Best Evidence Rule covers a wide range of evidence, including title
records,74 claim forms,75 bills,76 deeds,77 and sound recordings.78
68. Id. at 60.
69. Id. One might just as easily argue that the witness’s testimony was offered to prove
the contents of the document. In other words, one could argue that the only way that the
witness’s testimony proved that the wife knew “that the policy existed” was by the witness
testifying that the document she found was a life insurance policy on the husband’s life,
proving the contents of that document. This underscores the fact that courts have conflicting theories of when writings, recordings, or photographs are offered for purposes other
than proving their contents. See R.R. Mgmt. Co. v. CFS La. Midstream Co., 428 F.3d 214,
218 (5th Cir. 2005) (“The authorities from other jurisdictions appear to be in conflict.”).
70. JAG Consulting v. Eubanks, 72 S.W.3d 549, 555 (Ark. Ct. App. 2002).
71. Id. at 552, 555.
72. Id. at 555.
73. FED. R. EVID. 1001(1).
74. See, e.g., White Indus. v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 611 F. Supp. 1049, 1077–78 (W.D. Mo.
1985) (finding that the Best Evidence Rule applies to Federal Aviation Administration title
records).
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Moreover, courts have given the phrase “their equivalent” an expansive reading, capturing an even broader range of items under the
purview of the Best Evidence Rule.79 For instance, in Seiler v. Lucasfilm, Ltd.,80 graphic artist Lee Seiler brought a copyright infringement
claim against Lucasfilm alleging that the “Imperial Walkers” from the
movie The Empire Strikes Back infringed on Seiler’s copyrighted “Garthian Striders.”81 Seiler, however, did not obtain his copyright until
after the movie was released, but alleged that he first published his
“Garthian Striders” in 1976 and 1977.82 At trial, Seiler could not produce his original drawings and instead sought to prove his case
through reconstructions he created for trial.83 Seiler alleged that the
Best Evidence Rule did not apply to his drawings because they were
not writings, recordings, or photographs.84 The United States Court
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, finding that his drawings
“consist[ed] not of ‘letters, words, or numbers’ but of ‘their
equivalent.’”85 It found that the drawings were equivalents because
“[j]ust as a contract objectively manifests the subjective intent of the
makers, so Seiler’s drawings are objective manifestations of the creative mind.”86
Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(2) more clearly defines the term
“photograph.” According to the Rule, the term “‘[p]hotographs’ include[s] still photographs, X-ray films, video tapes, and motion pictures.”87 Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(3) indicates that “[a]n
‘original’ of a photograph includes the negative or any print therefrom.”88 Furthermore, “[i]f data are stored in a computer or similar
device, any printout or other output readable by sight, shown to re75. See, e.g., United States ex rel. El-Amin v. George Washington Univ., 522 F. Supp. 2d
135, 140, 144–45 (D.D.C. 2007) (finding that the Best Evidence Rule applies to Health
Care Financing Administration claim forms).
76. See, e.g., Oliver v. Sioux City Cmty. Sch. Dist., 389 N.W.2d 665, 667 (Iowa 1986)
(finding that a bill for ambulance services is a writing under the Best Evidence Rule).
77. See, e.g., Gleason v. Galvin, 373 N.E.2d 357, 359 (Mass. 1978) (assuming, arguendo,
that the Best Evidence Rule would bar admission of a certified copy of a deed).
78. See, e.g., Hall v. State, 829 S.W.2d 407, 409 (Tex. App. 1992) (“[S]ound recordings
are included in the definition of ‘recordings.’”).
79. See Rule 1001: The “Original Document” Rule, 12 TOURO L. REV. 617, 621 (1996) (discussing the “expansive definition” of words and recordings under Rule 1001(1)).
80. 808 F.2d 1316 (9th Cir. 1986).
81. Id. at 1317.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1318.
84. Id. at 1319.
85. Id. at 1318–19.
86. Id. at 1320.
87. FED. R. EVID. 1001(2).
88. Id. 1001(3).

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr103.txt

2008]

unknown

AUTHENTICITY

OF

Seq: 12

ORIGINALS

25-NOV-08

13:42

171

flect the data accurately, is an ‘original.’”89 Therefore, if the proponent of the evidence creates data, such as work logs, not on paper, but
on a computer, any printout from the computer is admissible as an
“original,” and the proponent does not have to introduce the computer or hard drive at trial.90 The “output readable by sight” portion
of the Rule covers evidence such as computer-generated displays.91
Rule 1001(3) also defines “[a]n ‘original’ of a writing or recording [a]s the writing or recording itself or any counterpart intended to
have the same effect by a person executing or issuing it.”92 Therefore,
when a person executes a document such as a contract, will, or deed,
the writing that he executed is clearly an original.93 Moreover, under
the Rule, there can be multiple originals. To wit, “[i]f each party to a
contract, lease, sale, or other transaction receives or retains a copy of
the instrument that embodies or evidences the transaction, each copy
is considered an original, regardless of the mechanism or the chronology of their creation.”94
Finally, Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(4) defines a “duplicate” as
“a counterpart produced by the same impression as the original, or
from the same matrix, or by means of photography, including enlargements and miniatures, or by mechanical or electronic re-recording, or by chemical reproduction, or by other equivalent techniques
which accurately reproduces the original.”95 Rule 1001(4) thus refers
to four kinds of duplicates: “same impression (such as carbon or socalled ‘carbonless’ or ‘formpack’ copies), same matrix (such as offset
printing, often called ‘multilith’; stencil duplication or ‘mimeograph’;
or hectograph or ‘ditto’), photography (such as micrography or
microfiche), and chemical reproduction (such as electrostatic or xerigraphic [sic] ‘photocopies’).”96 Courts have used the “other
equivalent techniques” language of Rule 1001(4) to qualify, inter alia,
89. Id.
90. See, e.g., Touche Ross & Co. v. Landskroner, 486 N.E.2d 850, 852 (Ohio Ct. App.
1984) (holding that printouts of work logs on the appellant’s account were “originals”
under Ohio’s counterpart to Rule 1001(3)).
91. See Burleson v. State, 802 S.W.2d 429, 441 (Tex. App. 1991) (“If the objection was
addressed to the actual display itself, the display qualified as an original under the best
evidence rule because it was output other than a printout, was readable by sight, and was
shown to be an accurate reflection of data.”).
92. FED. R. EVID. 1001(3).
93. See Andrew M. Grossman, No, Don’t IM Me—Instant Messaging, Authentication, and the
Best Evidence Rule, 13 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1309, 1336 (2006) (“The language applies most
readily, of course, to matters of contracts, wills, deeds, and the like . . . .”).
94. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 105.
95. FED. R. EVID. 1001(4).
96. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 107–08.
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facsimiles as duplicates.97 Essentially, then, “any mechanically created
reproduction is a duplicate; a manually created production, because
of the risk of human error, is not.”98
c. Rule 1003: The Duplicate Exception
Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 is consistent with the emerging
state trend finding mechanically produced duplicates admissible even
when proponents could not account for the nonproduction of originals. It states that “[a] duplicate is admissible to the same extent as an
original unless (1) a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity
of the original or (2) in the circumstances it would be unfair to admit
the duplicate in lieu of the original.”99 Under Rule 1003, duplicates
are thus admissible as long as they can meet the liberal authentication
test laid out in Rule 901(a), unless one of the exceptions in subsections (1) or (2) applies. Since Rule 1003 was passed, “duplicates are
more often admitted into evidence than originals.”100 Every state has
either adopted a counterpart to Rule 1003 or some version of the similar Uniform Photographic Copies of Business and Public Records as
Evidence Act.101
The exception contained in subsection (2) of Rule 1003 applies
where only part of an original document or recording is reproduced
in a duplicate, and the remainder is needed for some purpose, such as
cross-examination.102 Courts have consistently found that the exception contained in Rule 1003(2) applies when duplicates fail to fully
reproduce important or critical parts of an original document or recording.103 This exception is not the focus of this Article.
In contrast, I cannot locate a single case where a court sets forth a
test for determining when the opponent of a duplicate raises a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original under Rule 1003(1).
What is clear, however, is that “[a]lmost all of the reported cases
97. See, e.g., Burger Man, Inc. v. Jordan Paper Prods., Inc., 352 N.E.2d 821, 829–30
(Ind. Ct. App. 1976) (finding that a facsimile qualified as a duplicate).
98. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 107. The advisory committee noted that “[c]opies subsequently produced manually, whether handwritten or typed, are not within the definition.” FED. R. EVID. 1001(4) advisory committee’s note.
99. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
100. Lorraine v. Markel Am. Ins. Co., 241 F.R.D. 534, 576 (D. Md. 2007).
101. See Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Anne R. Keyes MacIver, Demistifying Spoliation of Evidence, 34
TORT & INS. L.J. 761, 779–82 (1999).
102. FED. R. EVID. 1003 advisory committee’s note (construing United States v. Alexander, 326 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1964)).
103. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. United States, 619 F.2d 1383, 1391 (10th Cir. 1980)
(affirming the district court’s exclusion of a duplicate of a deed under Rule 1003(2) on the
ground that the copy did not reproduce the most critical part of the original).
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which address complaints that a duplicate was admitted over an objection asserting the existence of a genuine question of authenticity reject the claim.”104 These cases will be addressed in Part II. The few
instances in which courts have found that opponents of duplicates
raised genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals have consisted mainly of cases where the proponents of duplicates admitted
that they altered either the duplicates or the originals from which the
duplicates were produced.105
For instance, in Boswell v. Jasperson,106 Marsden and Melva Larsen
sold land, including a feed yard, to Garth Boswell in 1974.107 Garth
later obtained loans on the property from Zions First National Bank
and the Farmers Home Administration.108 In 1982, Garth filed for
bankruptcy, listing the feed yard as part of his real estate property
holdings on the petition, and his son, William P. Boswell, sought to
establish that he had an ownership interest in the feed yard.109 As
support for his claim, William introduced an alleged copy of the original deed from the Larsens to his father, which he claimed was altered
with the consent of all parties “to substitute his name, William P. Boswell and his d/b/a Rafter ‘B’ Ranch, as grantees.”110 William admitted, however, that the loan holders were never notified of this alleged
alteration, and Garth contradicted himself, alternatively contending
that the original deed was and was not altered.111 Although the court
failed to set forth a test for determining whether there was a genuine
question raised as to the original’s authenticity, it concluded that
“there [wa]s a genuine question as to the authenticity of the proffered
altered deed.”112
Furthermore, courts have held in some circumstances that the
opponent of a duplicate raises a genuine question as to the authenticity of an original under Rule 1003(1) by either demonstrating a genuine question “‘as to the authenticity of the unintroduced original, or
104. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 114. Although Wellborn made this comment in 1986,
the same remains true today. See, e.g., supra notes 21–27 and accompanying text.
105. See, e.g., S.E.C. v. Hughes Capital Corp., 124 F.3d 449, 456 (3d Cir. 1997) (finding
that a genuine question existed as to the authenticity of check stubs where the proponent
admitted that the original stubs were altered before photocopying).
106. 266 F. Supp. 2d 1314 (D. Utah 2003).
107. Id. at 1316.
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. at 1316–17.
112. Id. at 1321.
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as to the trustworthiness of the duplicate . . . .’”113 For instance, courts
are unanimous in finding that when the opponent of an alleged duplicate, such as a “copy” of a note, claims that the duplicate is inauthentic because the original note never existed, the opponent potentially
raises a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original under
Rule 1003(1).114
What happens, however, when the opponent of this same “copy”
admits that there was an original note at some point, but claims that
the alleged duplicate is not an accurate copy of the original because,
inter alia, it was materially altered in some fashion? As will be noted
infra, some courts hold that the opponent in this situation is merely
raising genuine questions as to the authenticity of the duplicate and is
not raising genuine questions as to the authenticity of the original,
making Rule 1003(1) inapplicable.115 But this analysis is nonsensical.
Pursuant to Rule 1001(4), “‘[a]uthentication [of a photocopy] requires proving two facts: the original from which the duplicate was
copied is itself authentic and, again, the duplicate is an accurate reproduction of that original.’”116
In other words, when a proponent authenticates a duplicate
under Rule 1001(4), he is saying that the duplicate, B, is an accurate
reproduction of the original, A. Thus, the proponent is saying that A
= B. If the opponent admits that the original existed at some point
but claims that the “duplicate” was materially altered, he is saying that
the duplicate, B, is inauthentic and that A • B. Because the proponent
claims that A = B and the opponent claims that A • B, there is a dispute as to the authenticity of both the duplicate and the original, despite what some courts have held.
d. Rule 1004: Excusing Nonproduction of Originals
Federal Rule of Evidence 1004 states that there are four circumstances under which the proponent of evidence concerning the contents of a writing, recording, or photograph is not required to
produce the original and instead can prove its contents through sec113. United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 557 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting United
States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1205 (5th Cir. 1980)).
114. See, e.g., Pro Bono Invs. v. Gerry, No. 03 Civ. 4347 (JGK), 2005 WL 2429777, at *4–5
(S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2005) (finding a genuine question as to the authenticity of a note when
the opponent raised the issue of whether the original note ever existed).
115. See infra Part III.D.
116. Dietrich v. Bauer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, 31 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1004 (2000)).
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ondary evidence.117 Secondary evidence includes any type of evidence besides the original, “ranging from photographs and
handwritten copies to oral testimony of a witness whose credibility is
suspect.”118 Indeed, courts have even held that when the opponent of
a duplicate has made a successful challenge to it under Rule 1003(1),
the proponent can still introduce the “duplicate” if he establishes one
of the Rule 1004 circumstances.119 Furthermore, courts have relied
upon the Advisory Committee’s notes to Rule 1004 in concluding that
there are no “degrees” of secondary evidence.120 Accordingly, once
the proponent meets his burden of proof in establishing one of the
Rule 1004 circumstances, he is free to submit any type of secondary
evidence;121 there is no requirement, for instance, that a “copy be introduced in preference to . . . oral testimony” on the ground that the
former is better evidence.122 Unfortunately, while most courts have
placed the burden of proof on proponents to establish one of the
Rule 1004 circumstances,123 they have consistently failed to flesh out
the nature of that burden.124
The first circumstance is triggered under Rule 1004(1) when
“[a]ll originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the proponent
lost or destroyed them in bad faith.”125 An example of this circum117. FED. R. EVID. 1004.
118. 6 WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1004.02[1] (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., 2d ed.
2008).
119. See, e.g., In re Anthony, No. 2002-A-0096, 2003 WL 22429035, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App.
Oct. 24, 2003) (“Even if Anthony met his burden to exclude the duplicate pursuant to
Evid. R. 1003, ‘[t]he original is not required, and other evidence of the contents of the
writing . . . is admissible if . . . all originals are lost or have been destroyed, unless the
proponent lost or destroyed them in bad faith . . . .’” (quoting OHIO R. EVID. 1004(1))).
120. United States v. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d 196, 203 n.8 (8th Cir. 1976) (citing FED.
R. EVID. 1004 advisory committee’s note) (internal quotation marks omitted).
121. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1068 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (“Once
the terms of Rule 1004 are satisfied, the party seeking to prove the contents of the recording . . . may do so by any kind of secondary evidence.”).
122. Standing Soldier, 538 F.2d at 203 n.8; see also Neville Constr. Co. v. Cook Paint &
Varnish Co., 671 F.2d 1107, 1109 (8th Cir. 1982) (finding that a buyer properly provided
testimony concerning the contents of a brochure destroyed by a fire despite the availability
of a similar brochure).
123. See, e.g., Burroughs Wellcome Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 632 F. Supp. 1213,
1223 (S.D.N.Y. 1986) (stating that the proponent “bears the burden of producing the original . . . or proffering an explanation for its absence”).
124. I have not found a single case where a court specified the burden of proof that the
proponent bears in the Rule 1004 context, such as proof by a preponderance of the
evidence.
125. FED. R. EVID. 1004(1). In order to establish that the original was in fact “lost or
destroyed” under Rule 1004(1), the proponent “may use circumstantial evidence such as
evidence of a diligent but unsuccessful search for the document.” Remington Arms Co. v.
Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 810 F. Supp. 1420, 1426 (D. Del. 1992).
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stance can be found in United States v. McMahon,126 where the First
Circuit found that the district court properly allowed testimony about
the contents of a note allegedly written by the defendant.127 The
court came to this conclusion under Rule 1004(1) because the defendant did “not suggest that the government lost or destroyed the document in bad faith.”128 It is difficult for the opponent of secondary
evidence to prove that its proponent lost or destroyed the original in
bad faith.129 Courts have determined that proponents of secondary
evidence satisfied Rule 1004(1) even when they acknowledged negligently destroying documents,130 using a process to copy a tape which
they knew would destroy the original,131 and erasing tapes in the ordinary course of business.132
Furthermore, a couple of recent court decisions have heightened
the hurdle that opponents of secondary evidence must leap in opposing the admission of secondary evidence pursuant to Rule 1004(1).
As noted, courts typically require the proponent of secondary evidence to establish one of the Rule 1004 circumstances, such as proof
that the original was lost or destroyed without bad faith.133 In two
2007 decisions, however, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan indicated that the opponent of secondary evidence “has the burden of establishing bad faith” under Rule 1004(1),
shifting the burden from the proponent to the opponent.134
The second circumstance in which a proponent may prove contents through secondary evidence occurs when “[n]o original can be
obtained by any available judicial process or procedure.”135 For in126. 938 F.2d 1501 (1st Cir. 1991).
127. Id. at 1508, 1509 n.4.
128. Id. at 1509 n.4.
129. See Wellborn, supra note 19, at 118 (stating that destruction often occurs in the
ordinary course of business and that negligent destruction may not rise to the level of bad
faith).
130. See, e.g., Estate of Gryder v. Comm’r, 705 F.2d 336, 338 (8th Cir. 1983) (affirming
the Tax Court’s finding that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue could produce secondary evidence concerning the contents of corporate records because IRS employees destroyed the originals “negligently but not in bad faith”).
131. See, e.g., United States v. Balzano, 687 F.2d 6, 7 (1st Cir. 1982) (finding that an
original tape was not destroyed in bad faith despite the government’s use of a process to
copy the tape that erased the original).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Workinger, 90 F.3d 1409, 1415 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding
that a lawyer’s erasure of a taped conversation in the ordinary course of business did not
constitute bad faith under Rule 1004(1)).
133. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
134. United States v. Culberson, No. 05-80972, 2007 WL 1452902, at *1 (E.D. Mich. May
15, 2007); United States v. Culberson, No. 05-80972, 2007 WL 1266131, at *2 (E.D. Mich.
Apr. 27, 2007).
135. FED. R. EVID. 1004(2).
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stance, in Allegra v. Bowen,136 the plaintiff applied for child’s disability
insurance because she had allegedly suffered from muscular dystrophy since early childhood.137 The plaintiff claimed that her childhood physician in Italy diagnosed her with this condition and
attempted to prove this diagnosis through a sworn physician’s letter
rather than the original clinical documents in which the diagnosis was
made.138 An administrative law judge denied the plaintiff’s application, finding that the letter was inadmissible under the Best Evidence
Rule, but the Eastern District of New York reversed, concluding that
the original clinical documents were unobtainable “by available judicial process or procedure” under Rule 1004(2), and allowing the
plaintiff to prove the documents’ contents through secondary evidence such as the letter.139 Courts have made clear that the proponents of secondary evidence need not make Herculean efforts to try to
obtain the original for Rule 1004(2) to apply.140 When, however, proponents of duplicates fail to engage in “diligent” efforts to establish
that originals are lost, destroyed, or unobtainable, courts will not permit the introduction of secondary evidence pursuant to Rule 1004(1)
or 1004(2).141
Under Rule 1004(3), the third circumstance in which a proponent may prove contents through secondary evidence occurs when:
[a]t a time when an original was under the control of the
party against whom offered, that party was put on notice, by
the pleadings or otherwise, that the contents would be a subject of proof at the hearing, and that party does not produce
the original at the hearing.142
The Eastern District of California found this portion of the Rule applicable in United States v. Cuesta,143 where the defendant appealed from
his conviction for being a minor knowingly driving a vehicle containing alcohol.144 At the defendant’s trial, the prosecution requested
that the defendant produce his driver’s license to prove his age, but
136. 670 F. Supp. 465 (E.D.N.Y. 1987).
137. Id. at 466.
138. Id. at 468.
139. Id. at 468–69.
140. See, e.g., United States v. Marcantoni, 590 F.2d 1324, 1329–30 (5th Cir. 1979) (finding that the government did not need to attempt to subpoena originals where it was “unrealistic” to expect that the subpoenaed documents would be produced).
141. See, e.g., Cartier v. Jackson, 59 F.3d 1046, 1048 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that the
proponent could not present secondary evidence concerning demo tapes when she failed
to conduct a diligent search for the original demo tapes).
142. FED. R. EVID. 1004(3).
143. No. 1:06-CR-40 AWI, 2007 WL 2729853 (E.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2007).
144. Id. at *2, *20.
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he refused; thereafter, the magistrate judge allowed the prosecution
to call the ranger who arrested the defendant to testify as to the defendant’s date of birth on his driver’s license.145 The court rejected the
defendant’s argument that this testimony violated the Best Evidence
Rule, finding, pursuant to Rule 1004(3), that the driver’s license was
in the defendant’s possession and that he failed to produce it at his
trial.146
Finally, under the “collateral matters” circumstance enunciated
in Rule 1004(4), secondary evidence is admissible when “[t]he writing, recording, or photograph is not closely related to a controlling
issue.”147 In Jackson v. Crews,148 a movie theater patron who had been
arrested for public intoxication and resisting arrest brought a Section
1983 action against the municipality and his arresting officer for excessive force.149 On appeal, after the district court awarded damages
to the plaintiff, the arresting officer alleged that the district court
erred by allowing the plaintiff to question a witness about the contents
of a flyer describing the arrest and asking “any eye-witnesses to contact
the person named on the flyer.”150 The Eighth Circuit determined
that the Best Evidence Rule did not preclude the testimony despite
the nonproduction of the flyer because, inter alia, the contents of the
flyer were “collateral to the principal issue in the trial.”151
e. Rule 1005: Public Records
Federal Rule of Evidence 1005 covers public records and indicates that:
[t]he contents of an official record, or of a document authorized to be recorded or filed, and actually recorded or
filed, including data compilations in any form . . . may be
proved by copy, certified as correct in accordance with Rule
902 or testified to be correct by a witness who has compared
it with the original.152
Rule 1005 also provides that “[i]f a copy which complies with the foregoing cannot be obtained by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
then other evidence of the contents may be given.”153 In other words,
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id. at *20.
Id.
FED. R. EVID. 1004(4).
873 F.2d 1105 (8th Cir. 1989).
Id. at 1106–07.
Id. at 1109–10.
Id. at 1110.
FED. R. EVID. 1005.
Id.
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the proponent can introduce a properly certified copy of a public record without accounting for the original, and, if a public record is lost
or destroyed without bad faith or is not available through any judicial
process, the proponent may prove its contents through secondary evidence pursuant to Rule 1004(1) and (2).154
f. Rule 1006: Summaries
Federal Rule of Evidence 1006 states that “[t]he contents of voluminous writings, recordings, or photographs which cannot conveniently be examined in court may be presented in the form of a chart,
summary, or calculation.”155 For this rule to apply, however, the proponent must make the originals or duplicates “available for examination or copying, or both, by other parties at a reasonable time and
place.”156 Rule 1006 is thus not an exception to the rule that proponents must produce originals or duplicates pursuant to Rules 1002
and 1003; instead, it merely states that proponents who have already
made lengthy originals or duplicates available for examination, copying, or both can later prove their contents through charts, summaries,
or calculations.
g. Rule 1007: Admissions
Federal Rule of Evidence 1007 allows for proof of the contents of
a writing, recording, or photograph through “the testimony or deposition of the party against whom offered or by that party’s written admission, without accounting for the nonproduction of the original.”157
For example, in Vigil v. Division of Child and Family Services,158 the trial
court considered whether David R. Vigil possessed material harmful to
a child in his home.159 At trial, a detective gave testimony and introduced into evidence a report concerning the contents of pornographic magazines and photographs seized from Vigil’s house
pursuant to a search warrant.160 On appeal, Vigil claimed that the
testimony and report violated the Best Evidence Rule because the
magazines and photographs were not produced.161 The Court of Ap154. See Brown for Brown v. Bowen, 668 F. Supp. 146, 150 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (“Once plaintiff introduces credible evidence of loss or destruction of a public record by the agency
with which it was filed, other evidence of contents of the record is admissible.”).
155. FED. R. EVID. 1006.
156. Id. The court may also “order that they be produced in court.” Id.
157. FED. R. EVID. 1007.
158. 107 P.3d 716 (Utah Ct. App. 2005).
159. Id. at 718.
160. Id. at 718–19.
161. Id. at 719.
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peals of Utah rejected this argument, noting that Vigil “testified at
trial that he had Playboy magazines and some videotapes that could
be considered pornographic in [his] house.”162 Because Playboy magazine was “material considered harmful to a child” pursuant to the
Division of Child and Family Services Manual, the court found that
Vigil had admitted the contents of the seized items pursuant to Rule
1007, precluding any Best Evidence objection.163
h. Rule 1008: Functions of the Court and Jury
Federal Rule of Evidence 1008 sets forth the respective functions
of the court and the jury in applying the Best Evidence Rule. Rule
1008 states that the court must resolve preliminary issues of fact while
the trier of fact must determine: “(a) whether the asserted writing
ever existed, or (b) whether another writing, recording, or photograph produced at the trial is the original, or (c) whether other evidence of contents correctly reflects the contents . . . .”164 The
Advisory Committee specifically noted that “the question whether the
loss of the originals has been established, or of the fulfillment of other
conditions specified in Rule 1004 . . . is for the judge” to resolve as a
preliminary issue of fact.165 Commentators and judges have determined that the issue of whether the party opposing the admission of a
duplicate has raised a genuine question as to the authenticity of the
original under 1003(1) is a preliminary issue of fact to be resolved by
the court.166
i. The Best Evidence Framework
Articles IX and X thus set up the following framework for how a
party can authenticate a writing, recording, or photograph or otherwise prove its contents. If the proponent of a writing, recording, or
photograph has the original, he can authenticate it under Rule 901,
or it can be self-authenticating under Rule 902. If the proponent does
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. FED. R. EVID. 1008.
165. Id. 1008 advisory committee’s note.
166. See, e.g., In re Porras, 224 B.R. 367, 371 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1998) (explaining that a
judge has “‘broad discretion’” in determining whether a legitimate issue has been raised as
to the authenticity of a duplicate under Rule 1003 (quoting 6 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1003.02 (2d ed. 1997))); Wellborn,
supra note 19, at 133 (“The following issues of fact must be decided by the judge, not the
jury, under the allocation made in Rule 1008 . . . whether, when a duplicate is offered, one
of the two conditions specified in rule 1003 . . . is present, so that the duplicate must be
excluded . . . .”).
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not produce the original but can account for its nonproduction under
Rule 1004(1), (2), or (3), he can prove its contents through any type
of secondary evidence, including duplicates falling under the exception contained in Rule 1003(1). Alternatively, if he can prove that the
original is not closely related to a controlling issue, he can do the
same under Rule 1004(4). If the proponent does not produce the
original and cannot account for its nonproduction, he can still prove
its contents through the opposing party’s admissions under Rule
1007, or, if the original is a public record, he can introduce a certified
copy in compliance with Rule 1005. If the proponent does not produce the original and cannot prove its contents pursuant to Rule
1004, 1005, or 1007, he can still prove its contents by introducing a
duplicate of the original pursuant to Rule 1003, “unless (1) a genuine
question is raised as to the authenticity of the original or (2) in the
circumstances it would be unfair to admit the duplicate in lieu of the
original.”167 Thus, the only party who would be “aggrieved” by courts
more readily finding genuine questions raised as to the authenticity of
originals would be a party submitting a contested “duplicate” of a nonpublic record which is closely tied to a controlling issue, but who is
unable to establish that the original was unobtainable, in the other
party’s possession, or lost or destroyed in the absence of bad faith.
II. TREATING PARTIES OPPOSING DUPLICATES
OPPOSING SUMMARY JUDGMENT

THE

SAME

AS

PARTIES

A. “Genuine Question” vs. “Genuine Issue”
A well-established and frequently invoked rule of construction is
“that effect should be given to every part of a statute, if legitimately
possible, and that the words of a statute or other document are to be
taken according to their natural meaning.”168 Federal rules such as
the Federal Rules of Evidence fall under the “other document” heading of this rule,169 forming a legitimate basis for the argument that
Rule 1003(1) should be read “so that the phrase ‘genuine question’ is
used in the ordinary sense: a question upon which, on the evidence
presented, reasonable persons might differ.”170 In other words, duplicates should be excluded under Rule 1003(1) when the party oppos167. FED. R. EVID. 1003.
168. Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 554 (1923).
169. See, e.g., In re Tetracycline Cases, 107 F.R.D. 719, 727 (W.D. Mo. 1985) (“Reference
to the general rules of construction suggests that any interpretation which makes a federal
rule superfluous is to be avoided.”).
170. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 116.

R
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ing their admission can make the same evidentiary showing as a party
opposing a motion for summary judgment.
One basis for this argument is that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2) contains similar language to Rule 1003(1). As noted,
under Rule 1003(1), a duplicate is not admissible to the same extent
as an original when “a genuine question is raised as to the authenticity
of the original.”171 Meanwhile, Rule 56(e)(2) indicates:
[w]hen a motion for summary judgment is properly made
and supported, an opposing party may not rely merely on
allegations or denials in its own pleading; rather, its response
must—by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set
out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. If the opposing party does not so respond, summary judgment
should, if appropriate, be entered against that party.172
Furthermore, beyond the apparent similarity between “genuine
question” and “genuine issue,” it is clear that courts have conflated
the two phrases. To wit, there are several cases where courts addressing motions for summary judgment have asked whether the opposing
party raised a “genuine question” of fact instead of a “genuine issue”
of fact.173 Other courts addressing motions for summary judgment
have used both phrases in the same sentence of an opinion.174
Similarly, in cases considering the applicability of Rule 1003(1),
at least one court has asked whether the party opposing the admission
of a duplicate raised a “genuine issue,” instead of a “genuine question,” as to the authenticity of the original.175 In fact, at least one
court has even misquoted Rule 1003(1) as stating that a duplicate is
not admissible to the same extent as an original when “‘a genuine
issue is raised as to the authenticity of the original . . . .’”176 Furthermore, as in the summary judgment context, other courts addressing
171. FED. R. EVID. 1003(1).
172. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(e)(2) (emphasis added).
173. See, e.g., Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 796 (1998) (resolving a motion for summary judgment by addressing whether there was a “genuine question” as to an
employer’s responsibility for unauthorized harmful conduct); Bowers v. NCAA, 9 F. Supp.
2d 460, 494 (D.N.J. 1998) (finding that “specific facts illustrate . . . genuine questions of
material fact” and denying summary judgment).
174. See, e.g., Jaramillo v. Colo. Judicial Dept., 427 F.3d 1303, 1310 (10th Cir. 2005)
(finding that an opposing party creates a “genuine issue” of fact precluding the entry of
summary judgment by raising a “genuine question”).
175. See, e.g., Tyson v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 958 F.2d 756, 761 (7th Cir. 1992)
(“In particular, it is the opponent of the evidence who bears the burden of showing that a
genuine issue of authenticity exists.”).
176. United States v. Hausmann, 711 F.2d 615, 618 (5th Cir. 1983) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 1003).
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Rule 1003(1) have used both phrases in the same sentence of an
opinion.177
Courts have consistently found that similar phrases in the Federal
Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should be
given the same effect. Looking back at Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, Subsection (e)(1) requires that an affidavit supporting or opposing summary judgment “must be made on personal knowledge.”178
Likewise, Federal Rule of Evidence 602 states that “[a] witness may not
testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a
finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter.”179
Courts addressing the issue of whether evidence is admissible under
both of these rules have found that evidence inadmissible under one
Rule is also inadmissible under the other Rule “for the same
reason.”180
By no means, however, have courts found that phrases in the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
should be given the same effect only when they are identical. Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 43(b) states that “[w]hen these rules require
an oath, a solemn affirmation suffices.”181 Federal Rule of Evidence
603 provides that “[b]efore testifying, every witness shall be required
to declare that the witness will testify truthfully, by oath or affirmation
administered in a form calculated to awaken the witness’ [sic] conscience and impress the witness’ [sic] mind with the duty to do so.”182
Notwithstanding these differences in phraseology, courts have determined that the two Rules are “parallel”183 and have the “same” effect
in that they afford a witness “the option of giving a nonreligious affirmation of her commitment to tell the truth rather than swearing on a
bible or to a divine Being.”184 Other examples where courts have interpreted similar language to have the same effect include Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 61 and Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a),185
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 32(a)(4) and Federal Rule of Evi177. See, e.g., United States v. Harris, Nos. 88-5663 to 88-5667 and 88-5691, 1990 WL
27340, at *5 (4th Cir. Feb. 26, 1990) (“Defendant Freeman raises no genuine issues as to
the authenticity of the original; mere speculation that the document is not a duplicate of
the original is insufficient to invoke a genuine question as to the original’s authenticity.”).
178. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(e)(1).
179. FED. R. EVID. 602.
180. Marley v. Addus Healthcare, Inc., 122 F. Supp. 2d 954, 956 n.2 (N.D. Ill. 2000).
181. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 43(b).
182. FED. R. EVID. 603.
183. Ferguson v. Comm’r, 921 F.2d 588, 589 (5th Cir. 1991) (citing Gordon v. State, 778
F.2d 1397, 1400 (9th Cir. 1985)).
184. Doe v. Phillips, 81 F.3d 1204, 1211 (2d Cir. 1996).
185. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 61 indicates:
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dence 804(b)(1),186 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 and Federal Rule of Evidence 102.187
Assuming that courts should give the phrases “genuine issue” and
“genuine question” the same meaning, the question becomes whether
courts have treated parties opposing the admission of duplicates
under Rule 1003(1) in the same manner that they have treated parties
opposing motions for summary judgment under Rule 56(e)(2).
B. Summary Judgment Feature 1: Material Disputes of Fact
Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c), a party may
prevail on summary judgment if “the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”188 As noted, when the movant has met
the requirements of Rule 56(c), the court should grant his motion for
summary judgment unless, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2), the nonmoving party “by affidavits or as otherwise provided in this rule—set[s] out specific facts showing a genuine issue for
trial.”189
Pursuant to Rule 56, courts have consistently found that “at the
summary judgment stage the judge’s function is not himself to weigh
the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine
whether there is a genuine issue for trial.”190 In deciding whether
there is such an issue, the judge “must look at the record in the light
[u]nless justice requires otherwise, no error in admitting or excluding evidence—
or any other error by the court or a party—is ground for granting a new trial, for
setting aside a verdict, or for vacating, modifying, or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order. At every stage of the proceeding, the court must disregard all
errors and defects that do not affect any party’s substantial rights.
FED. R. CIV. PRO. 61. In relevant part, Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a) states that “[e]rror
may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected . . . .” FED. R. EVID. 103(a). Courts have indicated that
these Rules have the same effect: the improper exclusion or admission of evidence does
not form the basis for a reversal if it constituted harmless error and substantial justice is not
denied. See, e.g., Fernandez v. Leonard, 963 F.2d 459, 465 (1st Cir. 1992).
186. See Wallace v. City of Tarpon Springs, No. 8:05-CV-979-T-EAJ, 2007 WL 128839, at
*2 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 12, 2007) (“[C]ourts have stated that Fed.R.Civ.P. 32(a)(4) and
Fed.R.Evid. 804(b)(1) should be construed together to resolve the question of a deposition’s admissibility.” (citing Clay v. Buzas, 208 F.R.D. 636, 638 (D. Utah 2002))).
187. See Duquense Light Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 66 F.3d 604, 609 (3d Cir.
1995) (stating that both Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 and Federal Rule of Evidence
102 “embody the principle that trials should be both fair and efficient”).
188. FED. R. CIV. PRO. 56(c).
189. Id. 56(e)(2).
190. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
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most favorable to the party opposing the motion, drawing all inferences most favorable to that party.”191 Accordingly, because the judge
“must accept the [nonmoving party’s] version of any disputed
facts,”192 courts often deny motions for summary judgment because
they can grant such motions only if “there is no dispute as to any fact
material to the issue being litigated.”193
Conversely, courts have consistently found that parties opposing
the admission of duplicates under Rule 1003(1) have failed to raise
genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals even when they
have raised material disputes of fact. In Dietrich v. Bauer,194 an investor, Del Dietrich, brought a class action lawsuit against Scorpion Technologies, Inc. (“Scorpion”) and its brokerage firms, among others,
claiming that all engaged in a plan to sell unregistered Scorpion
shares.195 Specifically, the class action alleged that the brokerage firm
Green-Cohn Group, Inc. (“Green-Cohn”), formed by Morton Cohn
and Van D. Greenfield, “acted as the conduit through which nearly 11
million shares of unregistered Scorpion stock were sold by foreign entities to investors in the United States, and that Green-Cohn reaped
substantial profits from these sales by being allowed to charge grossly
excessive commission rates on the trades.”196
After a complicated legal history, the surviving claims in the class
action lawsuit were against defendants Green-Cohn and Cohn himself.197 Cohn sought to submit into evidence a photocopy of a letter
from Greenfield to him dated January 4, 1991.198 The letter stated
that Cohn was the 100% owner of Green-Cohn, but it also indicated,
inter alia, “that Greenfield would ‘unilaterally make all management,
employment and trading decisions of [Green-Cohn]’ and would ‘have
total control over the entity and its management . . . .’”199
Dietrich moved to strike the photocopied letter under Rule 1003
based upon both lay and expert testimony.200 Greenfield testified that
he was uncertain whether he sent the original letter to Cohn and indicated that he only provided the photocopy to Cohn approximately
191. Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 816 n.26 (1982).
192. Forsham v. Harris, 445 U.S. 169, 191 n.10 (1980) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
193. Fountain v. Filson, 336 U.S. 681, 682–83 (1949); see also Weise v. Casper, 507 F.3d
1260, 1270 (10th Cir. 2007) (noting that the Supreme Court has explained that summary
judgment motions are “often denied” because there are material fact disputes).
194. 126 F. Supp. 2d 759 (S.D.N.Y. 2001).
195. Id. at 761.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 762.
199. Id. (quoting the January 4, 1991 letter).
200. Id. at 763–64.
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nine years after he allegedly wrote the original letter.201 More importantly, Cohn admitted “at his deposition that he did not know he was
the owner of the firm or even that there was a firm called GreenCohn, as well as that he had no recollection of the letter.”202 Cohn
apparently did present expert evidence that the photocopy of the letter was an authentic duplicate of a letter actually written on January 4,
1991,203 but Dietrich “retained a forensic expert who concluded that
the January 4 Letter was not in fact created on January 4, 1991.”204
Finding that Dietrich had not raised a genuine question as to the
authenticity of the original,205 the Southern District of New York’s decision clearly establishes that courts place a higher burden on parties
opposing the admissibility of duplicates than they place on parties opposing motions for summary judgment. The court first determined
that the fact that Dietrich had an expert whose conclusions regarding
the authenticity of the letter contradicted those of Cohn’s expert
“merely demonstrate[d] that there [wa]s a dispute of fact as to the authenticity of the document.”206 It then acknowledged that Dietrich
had pointed out that there were “certain inconsistencies between the
testimony of Cohn and Greenfield and the January 4 Letter.”207
Nonetheless, the court rejected Dietrich’s Rule 1003 challenge, finding that “there [wa]s sufficient evidence from which a jury could conclude that the document [wa]s indeed authentic . . . .”208
While courts have found that a nonmoving party raises the requisite genuine issue of fact necessary to defeat a motion for summary
judgment by creating a material dispute of fact,209 the Bauer case
makes clear that courts require a greater evidentiary showing by parties opposing the admission of duplicates under Rule 1003(1).210 Furthermore, while courts have found that nonmoving parties identifying
“specific factual inconsistencies” within and between witnesses’ testimony raise genuine issues of fact, precluding the award of summary
judgment,211 Bauer also establishes that specific factual disputes not
201. Id. at 762.
202. Id.
203. The court references “Cohn’s own expert evidence,” but never specifies what expert evidence he produced to support the authenticity of the letter. See id. at 763.
204. Id.
205. Id. at 764.
206. Id. (emphasis added).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 205–208 and accompanying text.
211. See, e.g., Corrugated Paper Prods., Inc. v. Longview Fibre Co., 868 F.2d 908, 914
(7th Cir. 1989) (noting that a nonmoving party raises genuine issues of fact for trial suffi-

R
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only within and between the testimony of witnesses, but also between
testimony and the duplicate itself, are not necessarily sufficient to
raise a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original.212
Both federal213 and state214 courts across the country have rendered decisions in line with the district court’s decision in Bauer, finding that the opponents of duplicates failed to raise genuine questions
as to the authenticity of originals despite pointing out or creating inconsistencies within and between witnesses’ testimony or between testimony and the duplicate itself. In addition, while courts cannot grant
summary judgment when there are competing expert opinions,215
courts have also agreed with Bauer that even expert evidence questioning the authenticity of originals is not necessarily sufficient to raise
genuine questions under Rule 1003(1).216 Finally, while judges considering motions for summary judgment must draw all inferences
most favorable to the nonmoving party,217 courts resolving Rule
1003(1) challenges frequently find that opponents of duplicates fail to
raise genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals even when
the issue of authenticity is subject to conflicting inferences.218
Courts have not been alone in requiring a higher evidentiary
showing by parties making Rule 1003(1) challenges than they require
cient to defeat a motion for summary judgment by identifying “specific factual inconsistencies” in witnesses’ testimony).
212. See supra notes 206–208 and accompanying text.
213. See, e.g., Amin v. Flagstone Hospitality Mgmt., No. 03-1181 (JRT/JSM), 2005 WL
3054599, at *3, *5 (D. Minn. Nov. 14, 2005) (finding a copy of a witness’s declaration
admissible despite the witness claiming that he did not type or sign the declaration).
214. See, e.g., Simons v. Simons, 11 P.3d 20, 25 (Idaho 2000). In Simons, the defendant
claimed that a duplicate memorandum agreement had been altered and presented the
testimony of one of the signers of the agreement to the same effect. See id. at 24. The trial
court, however, found that there was no genuine question raised as to the authenticity of
the original because the proponent presented witnesses who claimed that the duplicate
was authentic, and the Supreme Court of Idaho affirmed, finding that there was “substantial, competent evidence to support the decision . . . .” Id. at 25.
215. Phillips v. Cohen, 400 F.3d 388, 399 (6th Cir. 2005) (finding that summary judgment is improper when there is a battle of the experts).
216. See, e.g., WestRN-West Risk Markets, Ltd. v. XL Reinsurance Am., Inc., No. 02 Civ.
7344 (MGC), 2006 WL 2034627, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) (finding no genuine question as to the authenticity of a Premium Finance Agreement despite the defendant denying signing it, an expert report concluding that the defendant did not sign it, and no
expert evidence to the contrary).
217. See supra notes 191–193 and accompanying text.
218. See, e.g., People v. Garcia, 247 Cal. Rptr. 94, 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) (“The existence
of this possible conflicting inference goes to the weight rather than the admissibility of the
photograph, because conflicting inferences are for the jury to resolve.”). In contrast,
courts have found that summary judgment is appropriate only when “the record reveals no
evidence from which reasonable persons might draw conflicting inferences about the
facts.” Templet v. Hydrochem, Inc., 367 F.3d 473, 480 (5th Cir. 2004).

R

R
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of parties opposing motions for summary judgment. In Federal Evidence, authors Louisell and Mueller assert that despite the “apparent
meaning” of the phrase “genuine question,” “the mere fact that [the
proponent’s] adversary adduces counterproof which would enable a
reasonable jury to reject the duplicate upon the ground that the socalled original is not genuine does not justify excluding the duplicate
from the jury’s consideration.”219 They claim that the opponent of a
duplicate only raises a genuine question as to the authenticity of an
original when he presents “cogent and compelling evidence which
would require the jury to find that the original is not authentic.”220
C. Summary Judgment Feature 2: Not Resolving Credibility Issues
A subset of the principle that “at the summary judgment stage the
judge’s function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine
the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine
issue for trial”221 is the precept that it is inappropriate for a court “to
resolve issues of credibility, motive, and intent on motions for summary judgment.”222 Phrased differently, when resolving a motion for
summary judgment, a judge must draw all reasonable inferences in
favor of the nonmoving party on questions of credibility.223
In contrast, it is abundantly clear that courts faced with evidentiary challenges under Rule 1003(1) are resolving issues of credibility
and not drawing reasonable inferences in favor of nonmoving parties.
In Pahl v. Commissioner,224 the Ninth Circuit reviewed the United
States Tax Court’s conclusion that, in 1990, Stephen Pahl was a shareholder in a law firm and failed to report his pro rata share of the
firm’s 1990 income on his tax returns.225 Prior to 1989, Gerald Niesar
and Garrett Cecchini were the sole shareholders in their law firm,
Niesar & Cecchini.226 In 1989, Stephen Pahl and Thomas Gosselin
successfully negotiated with Niesar and Cecchini to join their law firm,
219. DAVID W. LOUISELL & CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 577, at 452
(1981).
220. Id. at 452–53 (emphasis added).
221. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).
222. Hardin v. Pitney-Bowes Inc., 451 U.S. 1008, 1008 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
223. See Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 501 U.S. 496, 520 (1991) (stating that a
court “must draw all justifiable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, including questions of credibility and of the weight to be accorded particular evidence”).
224. 150 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir. 1998).
225. Id. at 1125.
226. Id.
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but Pahl and Gosselin subsequently left the firm less than a year
later.227
An issue at Pahl’s trial was whether he joined the law firm as a
shareholder or in some lesser capacity.228 As support for the argument that Pahl was a shareholder, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (“Commissioner”) attempted to introduce into evidence Exhibit
O, a non-certified copy of a Certificate of Amendment that changed
the firm name to Niesar, Pahl, Cecchini & Gosselin, A Professional
Corporation.229 Pahl’s attorney objected to the introduction of this
copy on the ground that Pahl’s signature was forged. The court overruled his objection, but “did hold the record open so that [Commissioner] could submit certain documents.”230 Despite this, during trial,
the Commissioner never submitted any additional documents, and at
the end of trial, defense counsel renewed his objection, claiming that
the Commissioner “promised to provide an original or certified copy
of Exhibit O and failed to do so.”231
The court rejected this argument, noting that while it held the
record open during trial so that the Commissioner could submit additional documents, it could not conclude from the trial transcript that
the Commissioner “promised to submit an original or certified copy
of Exhibit O.”232 The court also found that Niesar properly authenticated Exhibit O pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 901(b)(1) because he testified that he saw Pahl sign the original Certificate, even
though there was no indication that Niesar had familiarity with Pahl’s
handwriting or signature.233 The court further found that Pahl had
not raised a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original
Certificate because it credited Niesar’s testimony that he saw Pahl sign
the original Certificate and “disbelieved [Pahl’s] testimony to the contrary.”234 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the Tax
Court did not abuse its discretion in “credit[ing] Niesar’s testimony
that he saw Pahl actually sign the [Certificate] and disbeliev[ing]
Pahl’s testimony to the contrary.”235
227.
228.
1998).
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.

Id.
Pahl v. Comm’r, 71 T.C.M. (CCH) 2744, 2746 (1996), aff’d, 150 F.3d 1124 (9th Cir.
Id. at 2747 & n.1.
Id. at 2747 n.1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Pahl v. Comm’r, 150 F.3d 1124, 1132 (9th Cir. 1998).
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Pahl seems to be a clear case where a court should not have
weighed credibility in determining whether there was a genuine question as to the authenticity of an original because: (1) the Commissioner did not produce an original or a certified copy of the
Certificate; (2) the sole authenticating witness was unfamiliar with
Pahl’s handwriting and biased against Pahl based on his abrupt departure from the firm; and (3) although it is unclear whether the Commissioner specifically promised to produce an original or certified
copy of the Certificate, it is clear that the Tax Court held the record
open in anticipation of the Commissioner producing such documentation.236 However, instead of finding that these facts raised genuine
questions as to the authenticity of the original, the Tax Court and the
Ninth Circuit answered those questions by weighing the credibility of
the witnesses and not drawing reasonable inferences in favor of the
nonmoving party.237 Courts at both the federal and state level have
largely followed suit, determining that genuine questions were not
raised as to the authenticity of originals only after deciding that the
proponents of duplicates were more credible than their opponents.238
D. Summary Judgment Feature 3: Not Weighing the Preponderance of
the Evidence
Another well-established principle in summary judgment jurisprudence is that the party opposing summary judgment does not
need to prove his claim or defense by a preponderance of the evidence; instead, the nonmoving party merely needs to present evidence which, when taken in the light most favorable to him, could
allow a jury to find by a preponderance of the evidence that he established his claim or defense.239 Courts have consistently found that a
judge deciding a motion for summary judgment does “not weigh the
preponderance of the evidence”240 and that actually deciding whether
the moving or nonmoving party has established his claim or defense
236. See supra notes 230–233 and accompanying text.
237. See supra notes 234–235 and accompanying text.
238. See, e.g., FDIC v. Hutcheson, No. 92-1679, 1993 WL 117828, at *3 (5th Cir. Mar. 26,
1993) (finding that discrepancies between the authenticating witness’s affidavit and supplemental affidavits were not sufficient to undermine his credibility enough to render copy
of a note inadmissible); Matter of Respondent V., No. 91-O-07092, 1995 WL 662679, at *6,
8 (Cal. Bar Ct. Nov. 1, 1995) (affirming denial of opponent’s authenticity challenge by
“defer[ring] to the hearing judge’s credibility determination”).
239. See, e.g., Humphrey v. Sears, Roebuck, & Co., 192 F. Supp. 2d 1371, 1375 (S.D. Fla.
2002) (“Plaintiff, in order to avoid summary judgment, does not need to show by a preponderance of the evidence that the reason given for her termination was pretextual.”).
240. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 410 F.3d 1052, 1068 (9th Cir. 2005) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
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by a preponderance of the evidence is “altogether foreign to summary
judgment.”241 Indeed, as the Supreme Court of the United States has
noted, when a defendant brings a motion for summary judgment, “the
judge must ask himself not whether he thinks the evidence unmistakably favors one side or the other but whether a fair-minded jury could
return a verdict for the plaintiff on the evidence presented.”242
Conversely, courts faced with Rule 1003(1) challenges have
found that parties failed to raise genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals based upon the bare finding that the proponents of
duplicates established authenticity by a preponderance of the evidence. In Braut v. Tarabochia,243 John Braut, the former president of
the Washington corporation Inseafuture, Inc. (“Inseafuture”),
claimed that in 1979 he loaned Arthur and Marilyn Tarabochia
$30,000 secured by their home.244 The Tarabochias subsequently divorced in 1988, and Marilyn received title to the house.245 James and
Susan Wierzbicki purchased the property from Marilyn’s estate after
her death in 1995.246 After the sale, the title company insuring the
sale learned of the alleged loan, and assisted Marilyn’s estate in a
quiet title action to remove the mortgage.247
At the ensuing proceeding, Braut “could not produce any written
documentation of the loan,” and summary judgment was entered for
the estate.248 Seven days later, Braut found a photocopy entitled “Collateral Agreement to Mortgage” bearing Arthur Tarabochia’s signature, and establishing loan terms.249 Marilyn’s estate subsequently
dismissed its claim.250
Inseafuture thereafter brought a mortgage foreclosure claim
against Tarabochia, the Wierzbickis, and a subsequent mortgage
holder, Washington Federal Savings.251 Before trial, the defendants
brought a motion in limine seeking to preclude admission of Exhibit 4,
the photocopied document, claiming that Arthur’s signature on the
photocopied document was a forgery, but the court reserved its decision until after trial.252
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.
247.
248.
249.
250.
251.
252.

United States v. White, 366 F.3d 291, 300 (4th Cir. 2004).
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
17 P.3d 1248 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001).
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1249 & n.1.
Id. at 1249.
Id.
Id.
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At trial, certain evidence supported the authenticity of the photocopied document. Specifically, John McPhee, an ex-FBI employee,
testified that he examined the photocopy and concluded that Arthur
Tarabochia’s signature did not indicate a “cut and paste” job.253 Additionally, a notarized mortgage in the record, which bore the
Tarabochias’ signatures, referred to the “‘terms of an agreement bearing even date,’” which ostensibly referred to the alleged loan.254 Finally, Richard Arambaru, Inseafuture’s attorney in 1979, stated that
he prepared the mortgage on a promissory note, presumably the alleged loan, and recorded it on August 16, 1979.255
Conversely, other evidence called into question the authenticity
of Exhibit 4. Braut testified at trial that he could not remember the
details of the transaction.256 Arthur Tarabochia then testified that he
could not remember Braut making a loan to him or his wife, that he
never signed any agreement with Braut, and that Braut had attempted
to bribe him before trial to testify that Braut had indeed loaned him
the money.257 Lastly, there were unanswered questions of why there
was a “considerable delay” before Braut attempted to recover on the
alleged loan and why Braut did not produce the photocopy at the
initial hearing during the quiet title action.258
At the close of the evidence, the court was ostensibly presented
with three possibilities: (1) Arthur Tarabochia never signed a loan
document and Braut’s alleged copy was a forgery; (2) Arthur
Tarabochia signed a loan document at some point, but Braut lost or
destroyed it, and Braut’s alleged copy was a forgery; or (3) Braut’s
alleged copy was an authentic copy of a loan document that Arthur
Tarabochia signed. The court accepted the third alternative, finding
that the photocopied document was admissible because the preponderance of the evidence did not suggest that Arthur’s signature was a
forgery.259 The trial court entered a judgment in favor of Inseafuture,
after which the Wierzbickis and Washington Federal Savings and Loan
Association appealed.260
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Washington noted that
“Washington courts have not addressed the circumstances in which a
253. Id. at 1250. Furthermore, “[h]e testified that this was the highest degree of certainty he could give to a photocopy.” Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id. at 1249.
257. Id.
258. Id. at 1250.
259. Id. at 1249.
260. Id.
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trial court abuses its discretion by admitting a duplicate of questionable authenticity.”261 Thereafter, the court deferred to the trial court’s
ruling, finding that the evidence supporting the authenticity of the
copy, “while not overwhelming, d[id] establish tenable grounds for
the trial court’s decision to admit the photocopy.”262 Several courts
across the country have come to the same conclusion as the trial court
in Tarabochia in Rule 1003(1) cases, finding duplicates to be admissible based upon finding by a mere preponderance of the evidence that
they were authentic.263 In contrast, appellate courts reviewing trial
court orders granting motions for summary judgment reverse those
orders based upon anything less than affidavits and other evidence
which “are so overwhelming that there is no basis for a trial and specific factual findings.”264
E. Conclusion
Courts consistently have required a greater evidentiary showing
by parties opposing the admission of duplicates under Rule 1003(1)
than they require of parties opposing motions for summary judgment
under Rule 56(e)(2). Based upon the similarity in language between
these rules and precedent giving the same effect to similar phrases in
other Federal Rules of Evidence and Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
this disparate treatment appears unjustified. The question then becomes whether these courts are relying upon Rule 1003’s legislative
history for this disparate treatment.
III. RULE 1003’S LEGISLATIVE HISTORY SUPPORTS TREATING
DUPLICATE OPPONENTS THE SAME AS SUMMARY JUDGMENT
OPPONENTS
The legislative history behind Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 provides an even stronger basis for the argument that courts should treat
parties opposing the admission of duplicates under Rule 1003(1) in
the same manner that they treat parties opposing motions for summary judgment. However, despite the legislative history unequivocally
261. Id. at 1250.
262. Id.
263. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, No. 02-3386, 2003 WL 22995207, at *2–*3 (3d
Cir. Dec. 22, 2003) (affirming the district court’s decision that a copy of an IRS form was
authentic by “the preponderance of the evidence”); United States v. Titterington, 354 F.
Supp. 2d 778, 787 (W.D. Tenn. 2005) (rejecting the defendant’s Rule 1003(1) objection to
the admission of a copy of a Barbados court order because the government proved the
authenticity of the original “by a preponderance of the evidence”).
264. United States v. Hoyts Cinemas Corp., 380 F.3d 558, 571 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986)).
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supporting a “liberal” reading of Rule 1003(1), courts have read the
exception in a manner so conservative as to render it meaningless.
A.

The Legislative History Behind Rule 1003

When the Supreme Court first proposed Federal Rule of Evidence 1003 in 1972, the proposed rule included the same exception
that the enacted Rule 1003 contains precluding a duplicate from being admissible to the same extent as an original if the opposing party
raises a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original.265 The
Supreme Court then sent this proposed rule to the Advisory Committee, and in its note to the proposed rule, the Committee indicated
that generally counterparts such as duplicates serve the purposes of
ensuring accuracy and genuineness “equally as well as the original . . . .”266 The Committee also stated that “if no genuine issue exists
as to authenticity and no other reason exists for requiring the original, a duplicate is admissible under the rule.”267 The Committee
noted that this position found support in case law.268
For example, in Myrick v. United States,269 a case cited by the Committee, the defendant was convicted of two fraud charges and appealed to the Fifth Circuit, claiming in part that the trial court
improperly admitted photostats of microfilms of documents such as
checks, instead of the originals.270 In finding that the trial court acted
properly, the Fifth Circuit cited to a previous case where it had allowed for the admission of a photostat that was identified by the
proper custodian, notwithstanding the Best Evidence Rule.271 The
Myrick court then found that the photostats in the case before it were
similarly admissible, but added the disclaimer that “[h]ad defense
counsel made the slightest suggestion that the photostats offered in
evidence were incorrect, or had he demanded production of the microfilms from which they were produced, it is apparent the trial judge
would have taken appropriate action, but that was not done.”272
265. See Dungar v. Happy Tiger Records, Inc., 116 Cal. Rptr. 412, 415 (Cal. Ct. App.
1974) (stating that under Proposed Rule 1003, duplicates were to be “admissible as originals unless a genuine question [wa]s raised as to the authenticity of the original”).
266. FED. R. EVID. 1003 advisory committee’s note.
267. Id.
268. Id. (citing Myrick v. United States, 332 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1964); Johns v. United
States, 323 F.2d 421 (5th Cir. 1963); Sauget v. Johnston, 315 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1963)).
269. 332 F.2d 279 (5th Cir. 1964).
270. Id. at 282.
271. Id.
272. Id.
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After the Advisory Committee considered the proposed rule, the
House Committee on the Judiciary held hearings on the proposed
rules of evidence.273 The Committee’s report indicated that Herbert
Hoffman, Esq., wrote a letter to Professor Edward W. Cleary, the Chief
Reporter for the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, in which he expressed concern that Proposed Rule 1003 would
unduly constrict the Best Evidence Rule and practically foreclose the
ability of a party who had not seen the original to challenge the accuracy of the duplicate.274 Professor Cleary then responded that “[i]f by
‘constricts’ it is meant that the rule relaxes the common law insistence
that the original in the strict sense be either produced or accounted
for, then I agree that the rule has that effect. In fact, that was the end
in view . . . drafting . . . the rule.”275 He indicated that while originals
typically had to be produced in the “prediscovery and pre-Xerox days”
to ensure that the parties presented the “most reliable information” to
the court, with the advent of discovery and xerography, this same objective could be achieved through the use of duplicates “without wasting a lot of time over ‘originals’ which no one really needs.”276
Professor Cleary went on to note, however, that when the proponent of a duplicate did not produce the original for the opponent to
inspect during discovery and the opponent had questions regarding
authenticity, “[t]he party complaining of lack of opportunity to see
the original would, in my opinion, find in the exceptions of Rule 1003
any protection which the circumstances justified.”277 According to
Cleary, “[o]ne relevant circumstance might well be the source of the
document. Thus an offer of duplicates of records of a disinterested
third party, e.g. a bank, would be less likely to raise a question of
genuiness [sic] or unfairness than would an offer of duplicates of a
party’s own records.”278 Other factors listed by Cleary were “[t]he nature of the documents themselves and their apparent completeness or
lack of it . . . .”279 Cleary finally noted that “[o]ther circumstances
might in addition call for consideration.”280
Despite Professor Cleary’s attempt to quell Hoffman’s concerns,
it appears that “the House Committee’s concerns were not altogether
273.
274.
1973),
275.
276.
277.
278.
279.
280.

See Hearings, supra note 31.
Letter from Herbert E. Hoffman, Esq., to Professor Edward W. Cleary (May 11,
in Hearings, supra note 31 at 82–83.
Cleary Letter, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

R
R
R
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assuaged . . . .”281 Accordingly, in its report on Rule 1003, the House
Committee noted that it approved the Rule “with the expectation that
the courts would be liberal in deciding that a ‘genuine question is
raised as to the authenticity of the original.’”282 The Advisory Committee then repeated this expectation of liberality in its note to Rule
1003.283
In a 1986 law review article, Professor Otis Guy Wellborn III
found that “[w]hether the federal courts in applying Rule 1003 have
been ‘liberal’ in this sense cannot be ascertained from reported
cases.”284 According to Wellborn, “[a]lmost all of the reported cases
which address complaints that a duplicate was admitted over an objection asserting the existence of a genuine question of authenticity reject the claim.”285 Immediately following this statement, Wellborn
listed several such cases in a footnote without further explication.286
Wellborn then noted that these cases were not dispositive on the issue
of whether courts had been “liberal” in finding genuine questions
raised as to the authenticity of originals because, according to him,
perhaps “even a ‘liberal’ construction of ‘genuine question’ would not
have extended to the objections raised in those cases.”287 With due
respect to Professor Wellborn, other cases seem to indicate clearly
that courts have been anything but liberal in finding that opponents
raised genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals under Rule
1003(1). And as the previous and following cases illustrate, the reluctance of courts to find “duplicates” inadmissible under Rule 1003(1)
did not end in 1986; instead, in almost all post-1986 state and federal
cases, both reported and unreported, courts presented with Rule
1003(1) challenges have rejected them, often in a manner which has
rendered the exception meaningless.288

281. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 114.
282. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 17 (1973).
283. FED. R. EVID. 1003 advisory committee’s note.
284. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 114.
285. Id.
286. See id. at 114 n.81 (citing Greater Kansas City Laborers Pension Fund v. Thummel,
738 F.2d 926, 928 (8th Cir. 1984); United States v. DiMatteo, 716 F.2d 1361, 1368 (11th
Cir. 1983); United States v. Balzano, 687 F.2d 6, 7–8 (1st Cir. 1982); United States v. Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1205 (5th Cir. 1980); United States v. Enstam, 622 F.2d 857, 866 (5th
Cir. 1981)).
287. Id. at 114.
288. See supra Part II; infra Part III.B.
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B. Rule of Construction: Not Rendering Parts of Federal Rules
Meaningless
As noted, a well-established and frequently invoked rule of construction is “that effect should be given to every part of a statute, if
legitimately possible, and that the words of a statute or other document are to be taken according to their natural meaning.”289 Thus,
because the Federal Rules of Evidence fall under the “other document” heading, they are not to be read so that any part of them is
rendered superfluous.290 Despite the applicability of this rule of construction to the Federal Rules of Evidence, many courts have read
Rule 1003 in a manner that renders the exception contained in Rule
1003(1) meaningless, and none have cited the expectation of liberality in its legislative history.
For example, in People v. Jenkins,291 the defendant appealed his
conviction for possession of a weapon by a previous offender.292 At
trial, the prosecution proved that the defendant was a previous offender by introducing an arraignment journal documenting the defendant’s felony conviction accompanied by a Certificate of
Acknowledgment executed by the Director of Records.293 The arraignment journal, however, which consisted of copies of Kansas State
Penitentiary Records, “was not certified by either the trial court that
had entered the judgment of conviction or by the clerk of the court in
which it was entered.”294 Furthermore, the registration number on
the actual arraignment journal and the Certificate of Acknowledgment did not match.295
The trial court determined that “this discrepancy went to the
weight [of the evidence] not the admissibility of the document.”296
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of Colorado found that “the question
of the authenticity of the original was resolved” with the Director of
Records’ Certificate of Acknowledgement, despite the discrepancy in
registration numbers, and held that “[t]he trial court correctly held
that [the] discrepancy pertained to the weight not the admissibility of
the document.”297
289.
290.
291.
292.
293.
294.
295.
296.
297.

Mason v. United States, 260 U.S. 545, 554 (1923).
See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text.
717 P.2d 994 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 994.
Id. at 994–95.
Id. at 994.
Id.
Id.
Id.

R
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In effect, this decision rendered the exception contained in Rule
1003(1) superfluous and meaningless. As noted, under Rules 901 and
902, when the proponent of evidence properly authenticates a document or the document is self-authenticating, any challenges that the
opposing party has with regard to its authenticity “go to the weight of
the evidence—not to its admissibility.”298 The decision of the Colorado court treats authentication challenges to duplicates in the same
manner as challenges to originals. According to the court, once the
prosecution properly authenticated the copies of Kansas State Penitentiary Records in the arraignment journal, the discrepancy and lack
of certification noted by the defendant could not “raise a question as
to the authenticity of the original[s],” but instead merely went to the
weight of the evidence.299 As such, under the Colorado court’s interpretation of Rule 1003, the rule should only state that “[a] duplicate is
admissible to the same extent as an original” because challenges to
properly authenticated duplicates merely go to the weight of the evidence and cannot raise genuine questions as to the authenticity of
originals. Federal and state decisions from across the country have
similarly held that authenticity challenges to duplicates merely go to
the weight of the evidence, not their admissibility.300
Courts, however, have not been alone in construing Rule 1003(1)
in a manner that renders it meaningless. In Federal Practice and Procedure, Charles Alan Wright and Victor Gold note that authentication of
a duplicate “requires proving two facts: the original from which the
duplicate was copied is itself authentic and, again, the duplicate is an
accurate reproduction of that original.”301 They then conclude that
“if the evidence concerning these facts is sufficient to support a finding of their existence, the item may be admitted and questions concerning the authenticity of the original and the accuracy of the
reproduction become matters for the jury to resolve.”302 Once again,
under this reading of Rule 1003, when the proponent properly authenticates a duplicate, the jury will receive the duplicate, and the op298. United States v. Tin Yat Chin, 371 F.3d 31, 38 (2d Cir. 2004).
299. Jenkins, 717 P.2d at 995.
300. See, e.g., WestRM-West Risk Mkts., Ltd. v. XL Reinsurance Am., Inc., No. 02 Civ.
7344 (MGC), 2006 WL 2034627, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. July 19, 2006) (“AIMCO’s arguments, however, go to the weight of the evidence, not to its admissibility.”); Lakeview Dairy Servs., Inc.
v. Dangler, 585 N.E.2d 472, 474–75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1989) (affirming the trial court’s decision that the appellant’s argument that a duplicate was forged and retyped went to the
weight of the evidence, not the duplicate’s admissibility).
301. 31 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 8004 (2000).
302. Id.
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ponent’s challenges merely go to the weight of the evidence and not
its admissibility, rendering Rule 1003(1) superfluous.
Finally, some courts have more bluntly rendered Rule 1003(1)
meaningless. For instance, in State v. Skimmerhorn,303 the Court of Appeals of Ohio noted that “[t]he only likely scenario under which a
party could raise a genuine question of authenticity, as provided
under [Rule] 1003, is if it had access to the original for comparison, in
which case the whole issue of admitting [the] copy would be moot.”304
Of course, such a conclusion is the antithesis of the rule that effect
should be given to every part of a statute or federal rule.305 It also fails
to bear out Professor Cleary’s proclamation in Rule 1003’s legislative
history that “[t]he party complaining of lack of opportunity to see the
original would, in my opinion, find in the exceptions of Rule 1003 any
protection which the circumstances justified.”306 The Court of Appeals of Ohio, however, is not the only court to fail to adhere to Professor Cleary’s words.
C. Duplicates of a Party’s Own Records
As noted, when concerns were raised about the ability of a party
being able to challenge the authenticity of a duplicate under Rule
1003, Professor Cleary responded that “[t]he party complaining of
lack of opportunity to see the original would . . . find in the exceptions of Rule 1003 any protection which the circumstances justified.”307 Cleary then noted that “an offer of duplicates of records of a
disinterested third party, e.g. a bank, would be less likely to raise a
question of genuiness [sic] or unfairness than would an offer of duplicates of a party’s own records.”308
A review of both federal and state cases, however, reveals that
only a single case has cited to Cleary’s proclamation that parties opposing the admission of duplicates would find protection under Rule
1003.309 There, the Court of Criminal Appeals of Texas affirmed the
admission of a “duplicate”310 over a vociferous dissent which contended that the disputed document was neither an original nor a duplicate.311 Meanwhile, not a single case has cited to Professor Cleary’s
303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.

835 N.E.2d 52 (Ohio Ct. App. 2005).
Id. at 59 (discussing the admissibility of public records).
See supra notes 168–169 and accompanying text.
See Cleary Letter, supra note 31.
Id.
Id.
Englund v. State, 946 S.W.2d 64, 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
Id. at 71.
Id. at 72 (Mansfield, J., dissenting).

R
R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr103.txt

200

unknown

Seq: 41

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

25-NOV-08

13:42

[VOL. 68:160

contention that “duplicates” in the possession of a party opponent
should be viewed with higher skepticism than “duplicates” in the possession of a disinterested third party. Furthermore, the cases considering Rule 1003(1) challenges based in part upon the opportunity for
mischief inherent in a duplicate being in the possession of an interested party make clear that courts have failed to give effect to Cleary’s
words.
In one such case, Alderson v. Bonner,312 the court considered the
appeal of Gary Lynn Bonner who was arrested for prowling outside
the residence of Kelli Alderson and carrying a video camera with a
tape that contained images of Kelli’s sister and mother in various
states of undress.313 A lower court convicted Bonner of a misdemeanor charge in connection with the incident, convicted him of a
felony charge which was later reversed, and dismissed a subsequent
criminal charge brought against him.314 After the court dismissed the
last charge, the tape recovered from Bonner’s video camera was destroyed.315 Before the tape was destroyed, however, a copy was made,
and at the civil trial of Kelli’s mother and sister against Bonner for
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress, the
court allowed the plaintiffs to introduce the copy of the videotape.316
On appeal, Bonner contended that the trial court should have
deemed the copy of the tape inadmissible because there were genuine
questions as to the authenticity of the original.317 The Court of Appeals of Idaho first noted that Officer Skoglund properly authenticated the copy by testifying that “he had viewed the videotape that was
being offered as evidence and that it was an accurate copy of the original.”318 Bonner alleged inconsistencies between the copy of the tape
and information in police reports and testimony, pointing out that
“Officer Skoglund’s police report described the videotape as forty-five
minutes in length, while the copy [wa]s only thirty-five minutes
long.”319 Bonner also contended that “the videotape copy was inadmissible because the plaintiffs did not show where the copy ‘came
from’ and did not prove a complete chain of custody.”320
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.

132 P.3d 1261 (Idaho Ct. App. 2006).
Id. at 1264.
Id. at 1265.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1266.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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The court rejected these arguments, finding that Officer
Skoglund explained that he merely estimated the videotape’s length
in his report.321 It thus found that the inconsistencies alleged by Bonner, although they ostensibly called into question the authenticity of
the original to a certain extent, did “not so refute Officer Skogland’s
[sic] testimony as to make the foundation inadequate.”322 With regard to the chain of custody argument, the court found that although
the “plaintiffs did not present evidence to show the origin of the copy,
Officer Skoglund’s testimony demonstrate[d] that there was no break
in the chain of custody up to the moment he first viewed the original
tape, and he testified that there was no material difference between
the two tapes.”323 The court was thus satisfied that plaintiffs demonstrated that the copy was substantially similar to the original.324
Alderson seems to be a case where application of Cleary’s words
from the legislative history might have compelled a different result.
While the court may have been right that Bonner’s challenges did
“not so refute Officer Skoglund’s testimony as to make the foundation
inadequate,”325 it seems likely that the heightened scrutiny suggested
by Cleary in situations where the copy is in the possession of an interested party would have compelled a different conclusion.
Other courts have more explicitly rejected the contention that
duplicates in the possession of interested parties, such as law enforcement agencies, “should be given higher scrutiny” because of “the opportunity for mischief.”326 Moreover, as in Alderson, courts have
consistently found that even parties combining chain of custody arguments with other challenges to the authenticity of documents in the
possession of interested parties do not raise genuine questions as to
the authenticity of originals.327 Finally, in anticipation of the argument that application of Professor Cleary’s words would too readily
result in courts finding genuine questions raised as to the authenticity
of originals, it bears repeating that “the House Committee’s concerns
321. Id.
322. Id.
323. Id.
324. Id.
325. Id.
326. United States v. Childs, 5 F.3d 1328, 1335 (9th Cir. 1993); see also United States v.
Georgalis, 631 F.2d 1199, 1205 (5th Cir. 1980) (“That the government had exclusive possession of certain copies for five years raises no issue.”).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Carrasco, 887 F.2d 794, 802–03 (7th Cir. 1989) (rejecting a
defendant’s Rule 1003(1) challenge to duplicate tape recordings in the government’s possession despite no evidence of chain of custody and the tapes solely being authenticated by
a confidential informant).
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were not altogether assuaged”328 by Cleary’s claims, resulting in the
Committee approving Rule 1003 “with the expectation that the courts
would be liberal in deciding that a ‘genuine question is raised as to
the authenticity of the original.’”329
D. Challenges to the Authenticity of Duplicates
As previously noted, a proper reading of Rule 1003(1) compels
the finding that the opponent of a duplicate raises a genuine question
as to the authenticity of an original by either “demonstrating ‘a genuine issue as to the authenticity of the unintroduced original, or as to
the trustworthiness of the duplicate . . . .’”330 Courts categorically
have read Rule 1003 in this manner when the opponent of a duplicate
contends that the original never existed.331 Many courts, however,
have come to the erroneous conclusion that when an opponent admits that the original existed but claims that the alleged duplicate is
not an accurate copy of the original because, inter alia, it was materially altered, the opponent cannot raise a genuine question as to the
authenticity of the original.
For instance, in Morales v. State,332 Arturo Morales appealed his
conviction for forgery and tampering with a government record.333
To be placed on the ballot in his campaign for Constable of Precinct 3
of El Paso County, Texas, Morales submitted a petition with voter signatures.334 The state, however, believed that some of the signatures
on the petition were forgeries, and proved these allegations by
presenting a photocopy of the petition at trial over Morales’ Rule
1003(1) objection.335 On appeal, Morales acknowledged the existence of the original petition but argued that the photocopy was inauthentic and claimed that “because the authenticity of the copy [of
the petition] was in question, that copy was not admissible in place of
the original.”336 The Court of Appeals of Texas rejected this claim,
finding that Morales’ “complaint [wa]s based upon a misunderstanding of Rule 1003 in that he [wa]s asserting that there was a question as
to the authenticity of the copy. Rule 1003 provides that the copy is
328. Wellborn, supra note 19, at 114.
329. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 17 (1973).
330. United States v. Chang An-Lo, 851 F.2d 547, 557 (2d Cir. 1988) (quoting Georgalis,
631 F.2d at 1205)).
331. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
332. 11 S.W.3d 460 (Tex. App. 2000).
333. Id. at 462.
334. Id.
335. Id. at 462, 464.
336. Id. at 464.
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inadmissible if there is a question regarding the authenticity of the
original.”337
With due respect to this opinion, it was the court, not Morales,
who was mistaken about the import of Rule 1003(1). As noted, pursuant to Rule 1001(4), “‘[a]uthentication [of a photocopy] requires
proving two facts: the original from which the duplicate was copied is
itself authentic and, again, the duplicate is an accurate reproduction
of that original.’”338 Thus, if the proponent of a duplicate, B, claims
that it is an accurate reproduction of the original, A, he is claiming
that A = B. If the opponent claims that the duplicate, B, was materially
altered from the original, A, he is claiming that the duplicate, B, is
inauthentic and that A • B. Because the proponent claims that A = B
while the opponent claims that A • B, a dispute exists as to the authenticity of both the duplicate and the original. Nonetheless, several
courts have rendered opinions in line with the Morales opinion, constituting another manner in which courts have engaged in a restrictive
reading of Rule 1003(1).339
E. Conclusion
While the legislative history behind Rule 1003 clearly supports a
liberal construction of the exception contained in Rule 1003(1),
courts have in fact read the exception in a manner that renders it
meaningless. Moreover, courts have failed to acknowledge Professor
Cleary’s words from the legislative history while rendering decisions
which contradict his proclamation that the opponents of duplicates
would find protection in Rule 1003’s exceptions. The question thus
becomes whether changes in copying technology since 1975 justify the
courts’ insouciance to Rule 1003’s legislative history.
IV. POST-1975 DEVELOPMENTS IN COPYING TECHNOLOGY SUPPORT
TREATING DUPLICATE OPPONENTS THE SAME AS SUMMARY
JUDGMENT OPPONENTS
Developments in copying technology since 1975 and the increasing ease with which nearly anyone can quickly create a fairly compelling forgery, provide further reasons why courts should treat parties
337. Id. at 465 (emphasis added).
338. Dietrich v. Bauer, 126 F. Supp. 2d 759, 763 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (alteration in original)
(quoting CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & VICTOR GOLD, 31 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
§ 1004 (2000)).
339. See, e.g., State v. Wasava, No. 41845-9-I, 1999 WL 169461, at *3 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar.
29, 1999) (“Wasava questioned the authenticity of the duplicates, not the original
checks . . . .”).
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opposing the admission of duplicates under Rule 1003(1) in the same
manner that they treat parties opposing motions for summary judgment. The case law reveals, however, that courts have rejected Rule
1003(1) challenges even when the opponents of duplicates have
presented evidence making it extremely likely that either unintentional technological flaws or intentional manipulation resulted in
proffered duplicates not accurately reproducing originals.
A.

History of Copying
1.

Copying in the Pre-Digital Era

Prior to 1780, “the only practical way to produce copies of original documents had been to write them over again by hand.”340 While
a few “clever copying devices” existed, “labor was cheap, and the general practice for quite some time remained that of employing clerks
(sometimes called scribes or ‘copyists’) to copy outgoing letters into
bound books of blank pages.”341 The problems attendant with the use
of copy clerks, however, were the length of time required to write the
document over again, the possibility of errors being made in the copy,
and the lack of privacy.342
James Watt changed the copying landscape with his invention of
the copying press or letterpress in 1780.343 Letterpress copies were
made by writing or typing the original in copying ink or with a copying pencil.344 Watt’s device “was essentially a bed in which the original and . . . copy paper were laid and in which they were pressed
together by means of a roller. The copy sheet was a thin paper which
was dampened prior to being used in the device.”345 While the image
of the copy was thus in reverse, it “could be read from the verso of the
sheet . . . . Copying a document in this way would transfer some of the
ink from the original to the copy.”346 Nonetheless, there were still
many concerns about copies produced through this device, such as
the flimsy copies it produced and the possibility that it could be used
for producing forgeries by, inter alia, transferring ink twice.347 In addition to letterpress copies, there were concerns about copies pro340. BARBARA RHODES & WILLIAM WELLS STREETER, BEFORE PHOTOCOPYING: THE ART &
HISTORY OF MECHANICAL COPYING, 1780–1938, at 7 (1999).
341. Id.
342. Id.
343. Id.
344. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 236 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
345. James Grant Stroud, Inks on Manuscripts and Documents - Part 2, 4 J. FORENSIC DOCUMENT EXAMINATION 1, 5 (1991).
346. Id.
347. RHODES & STREETER, supra note 340, at 8, 110.
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duced through other technologies such as polygraphs348 and copying
papers.349 These concerns, as well as the exorbitant cost of these technologies, led to the continuing use of copyists through most of the
nineteenth century.350 As a result of these concerns, neither a clerks’
copy351 nor a letterpress copy352 were admissible at trial when the proponent could not explain his nonproduction of the original.
All of this changed in 1937 when attorney Chester Carlson invented the process of xerography.353 Xerography, now commonly
used in photocopiers, is “a process of recording light and shadow on a
plate by means of electrostatic energy.”354 In response to emerging
technologies such as the Xerox machine, states in the twentieth century began enacting exceptions to the Best Evidence Rule which allowed for the admission of “duplicates” created without manual
transcription even when proponents could not account for the nonproduction of originals.355 When the Supreme Court initially proposed Article X of the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1972, the Advisory
Committee included a note to Proposed Rule 1001(4) indicating that
duplicates such as photocopies are largely treated like originals pursuant to Rule 1003 because they are “produced by methods possessing
an accuracy which virtually eliminates the possibility of error.”356
In addition to the judges, practitioners, and academics on the
Advisory Committee concluding that mechanically produced copies
were not plagued by human error, court decisions preceding the Federal Rules of Evidence largely found that mechanically produced copies were not susceptible to fraud. Of course, courts did note that
some risk of fraud existed in mechanically produced copies, leading
to the exception contained in Federal Rule of Evidence 1003(1). For
instance, in Toho Bussan Kaisha, Ltd. v. American President Lines, Ltd.,357
an importer brought an action against a carrier-by-sea, seeking to re348. Id. at 17–18.
349. Id. at 46–47.
350. Id. at 7–8.
351. See, e.g., Fisk v. Tank, 12 Wis. 276, 282, 300 (1860) (“The exhibit marked ‘B,’ being
a copy of the original contract, the non-production of which was not sufficiently accounted
for, was improperly admitted.”).
352. See, e.g., Huntington v. United States, 175 F. 950, 951 (8th Cir. 1909) (affirming the
trial court’s decision to exclude a press copy where the original’s nonproduction was not
explained).
353. See supra note 46 and accompanying text.
354. Application of Middleton, 319 F.2d 552, 552 (C.C.P.A. 1963).
355. See Wellborn, supra note 19, at 113 (noting that in 1959, Texas has already modified
its evidence statutes to allow for the admissibility of duplicates).
356. FED. R. EVID. 1001 advisory committee’s note.
357. 265 F.2d 418 (2d Cir. 1959).
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cover money it paid on fraudulently issued bills of lading.358 The importer sought to prove its damages through photostats “prepared
specially for the litigation” from accounting books.359 The trial court
excluded these photostats, and the Second Circuit affirmed, concluding that “in cases such as this there are dangers of ‘fraud’ and ‘imposition’ in the use of photostats prepared specifically for trial and not
made in the regular course of business.”360
For the most part, however, courts found that mechanically produced copies curbed the possibility of fraud inherent in the letterpress and similar technologies. For example, in State v. White,361 the
defendant appealed his conviction for knowingly uttering and publishing a forged money order at a Safeway store in Portland, Oregon.362 Part of the evidence used to convict him consisted of
photostatic copies of the money order inventory, money order receipts, and reports of stolen money orders.363 On his appeal to the
Court of Appeals of Oregon, the defendant claimed that the trial
court improperly allowed a witness to testify from these copies.364
The court rejected his argument, finding that the prosecution’s
evidence consisted of “photographic copies, produced by a copying
process commonly known as ‘xeroxing,’ or a similar process, which
produces such accurate reproductions of the original writing as to
preclude any reasonable challenge that they are facsimiles.”365 It then
quoted a case from the Second Circuit, stating:
[T]he best evidence rule should not be pushed beyond the
reason upon which it rests. It should be so applied, as the
Supreme Court held in an early case, as to promote the ends
of justice, and guard against fraud or imposition. The rule is
not based upon the view that the so-called secondary evidence is not competent, since, if the best evidence is shown
to be unobtainable, secondary evidence at once becomes admissible. And if it appear, as it does here, that what is called
the secondary evidence is clearly equal in probative value to
what is called the primary proof, and that fraud or imposition, reasonably, is not to be feared, the reason upon which
the best evidence rule rests ceases, with the consequence that
358.
359.
360.
361.
362.
363.
364.
365.

Id. at 420.
Id. at 422–23.
Id. at 424.
477 P.2d 917 (Or. Ct. App. 1970).
Id. at 918.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 919.
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in that situation the rule itself must cease to be applicable, in
consonance with the well established maxim—cessante ratione legis, cessat ipsa lex [a law lacking rationality ceases to
be law].366
The import of White and similar cases367 was clear: judges felt that they
did not reasonably need to fear that mechanically produced copies
were fraudulent.
2. Copying in the Digital Era
While the level of copying technology may have justified such
idolatry of copies even through 1986, when Professor Wellborn indicated that most courts rejected challenges to the authenticity of originals brought under Rule 1003(1), today’s technology presents a
markedly different landscape. Dr. Hany Farid, head of the Image Science Laboratory at Dartmouth and the founder of digital forensics,368
noted in 2006 that “[t]oday’s technology allows digital media to be
altered and manipulated in ways that were simply impossible twenty
years ago.”369 There is now an “ease with which digital material can be
manipulated” based upon “the rapid increase in low-cost and sophisticated digital technology . . . .”370
For example, inexpensive and powerful digital cameras and
photo-editing software make digital manipulation quite easy and often
leave no visual evidence of such manipulation.371 As Dr. Farid has
noted, “[i]n today’s world, anyone with a digital camera, a PC,
Photoshop and an hour’s worth of time can make fairly compelling
digital forgeries.”372 Furthermore, while it is impossible to determine
with certainty whether the increased ease in which writings, record366. Id. (quoting United States v. Manton, 107 F.2d 834, 845 (2d Cir. 1939)) (internal
citation and quotation marks omitted).
367. See, e.g., United States v. Sheehan, 428 F.2d 67, 79 (8th Cir. 1970) (finding that the
trial court properly admitted photostatic copies, noting that it was not feared that they
were fraudulent).
368. Hany Farid Faculty Profile for Dartmouth College Research Page, http://www.cs.
dartmouth.edu/farid/research/ (last visited Nov. 17, 2008); Michael Coburn, Farid Founds
“Digital Forensics,” THE DARTMOUTH, Mar. 27, 2008, http://thedartmouth.com/2008/03/
27/news/farid/.
369. Hany Farid, Digital Doctoring: How to tell the real from the fake, 4, http://www.ists.
dartmouth.edu/library/315.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Digital Doctoring].
370. Hany Farid, Detecting Digital Forgeries Using Bispectral Analysis, 2, ftp://publications.ai.mit.edu/ai-publications/pdf/AIM-1657.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008) [hereinafter Detecting].
371. Alin C. Popescu & Hany Farid, Statistical Tools for Digital Forensics, 1, http://
www.ists.dartmouth.edu/library/32.pdf (last visited Nov. 17, 2008).
372. Claudia Dreifus, A Conversation with Hany Farid: Proving that Seeing Shouldn’t Always
be Believing, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2007, at F2.
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ings, and photographs can be manipulated or forged has resulted in
an actual increase of alterations and fabrications, Dr. Farid also noted
that one publication has estimated that 20 percent of accepted manuscripts contain at least one inappropriately manipulated image.373
Moreover, according to Dr. Farid, the Federal Office of Research Integrity has seen the number of fraud investigations for contested
images rise from less than 3 percent in 1990 to 44.1 percent in
2006.374
These numbers are especially troubling because, “while the technology to manipulate digital media is developing at break-neck
speeds, the technology to contend with its ramifications is lagging behind.”375 And just as “[t]oday’s technology allows digital media to be
altered and manipulated in ways that were simply impossible twenty
years ago[,] [t]omorrow’s technology will almost certainly allow for us
to manipulate digital media in ways that today seem unimaginable.”376
Such concerns, however, have come not only from the digital
forensics community, but also from the legal community. In its 1994
Federal Guidelines for Searching and Seizing Computers (“Federal
Guidelines”), the Department of Justice Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section (“CCIPS”) advocated the use of digital signatures to help authenticate electronic evidence.377 After this
recommendation, CCIPS cautioned:
For the time being, however, most computer evidence can
still be altered electronically—in dramatic ways or in imperceptible detail—without any sign of erasure. But this
does not mean that electronic evidence, having become less
distinctive, has become any less admissible. It simply may require us to authenticate it in other ways.378
This analysis not only supports a reading of Rule 1003(1) under which
courts more readily find genuine questions raised as to the authenticity of originals but also the argument that courts should stop treating

373.
374.
375.
376.
377.

Id.
Id.
Popescu & Farid, supra note 371, at 1.
Farid, Digital Doctoring, supra note 369, at 4.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE COMPUTER CRIME AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY SECTION,
FEDERAL GUIDELINES FOR SEARCHING AND SEIZING COMPUTERS 119 (July 1994), available at
http://epic.org/security/computer_search_guidelines.txt [hereinafter 1994 FEDERAL
GUIDELINES].
378. Id.
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printouts and outputs from data stored in computers as “originals”
under Rule 1001(3),379 an argument beyond the scope of this article.
In its 1994 Federal Guidelines, the CCIPS also noted that when
“evidence is not distinctive but fungible (whether little bags of cocaine, bullet shell casings, or electronic data), the ‘process or system’ . . . which authenticates the item is a hand-to-hand chain of
accountability” referred to as “chain of custody.”380 Typically, proponents do not need to prove chain of custody to authenticate videotapes and photographs because they are considered “distinct
recognizable physical object[s] that can be identified upon observation.”381 This reasoning helps explain why the Court of Appeals of
Idaho found the copy of the videotape in Alderson admissible even
though, among other issues, the proponent failed to prove a complete
chain of custody and who made the copy.382
The 1994 Federal Guidelines, however, cautioned that this loose
authentication requirement might need to be tightened based upon
the ease with which evidence can be digitally manipulated. They
noted:
Although courts generally have allowed any witness with
knowledge to authenticate a photograph without requiring
the photographer to testify, that may not suffice for digital
photos. Indeed, judges may now demand that the proponent
of a digital picture be ready to establish a complete chain of
custody—from the photographer to the person who produced the printout for trial. Even so, the printout itself may
be a distinctive item when it bears the authenticator’s initials,
or some other recognizable mark. If the photographer takes
a picture, and then immediately prints and initials the image
that becomes an exhibit, the chain of custody is just that simple. But if the exhibit was made by another person or at a
later time, the proponent should be ready to show where the
data has been stored and how it was protected from
alteration.383

379. See Farid, Detecting, supra note 370, at 2 (“Given the ease with which digital material
can be manipulated it is surprising that the courts have adopted such a broad definition of
original.”).
380. 1994 FEDERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 377, at 119–20.
381. Smith v. State, 647 S.E.2d 346, 349 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Gadson v. State,
437 S.E.2d 313, 315 (Ga. 1993)).
382. See supra notes 317–324 and accompanying text.
383. 1994 FEDERAL GUIDELINES, supra note 377, at 119–20.

R

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\M\MLR\68-1\mlr103.txt

210

unknown

Seq: 51

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
3.

25-NOV-08

13:42

[VOL. 68:160

Copying in Popular Fiction

The history of copying has been tracked by the popular fiction of
its respective eras, and, until the last several years, legal authorities
and courts have responded either directly to these works of fiction or
the sentiments they reflected. The classic example from the preXerox era is Charles Dickens’ A Christmas Carol.384 The McCormick on
Evidence entry on the Best Evidence Rule notes:
[t]he treatment of copies under the rule requiring the production of the original document can only properly be understood when viewed in light of the technological history of
copying itself. In its earliest stages, the rule appears to have
developed against a background of copying performed by individuals of the Bob Cratchit sort, transcribing manually not
always under the best of conditions.385
Furthermore, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals noted:
[Commentators have] vividly describe[d] the human frailty
of a copier, as a Bob Cratchit, fingers numbed by the cold in
the counting house and fraught with anxiety over the health
of Tiny Tim, might distractedly misplace a decimal point, invert a pair of digits or drop a line. A Xerox machine, by way
of contrast, does not worry about Tiny Tim and does not,
therefore, misplace decimal points, invert digits, drop lines,
or suffer any of the other mental lapses that flesh is heir
to.386
Many cases have cited these passages in support of their findings that
the opponents of duplicates failed to raise genuine questions as to the
authenticity of originals.387
After the invention of xerography and other modern copying
technologies, however, works of popular fiction represented and indeed forwarded the courts’ belief that mechanically produced duplicates were immune from error and largely immune from fraud. The
classic example of society’s idolatry of the photocopy comes from
1982’s Academy Award nominated film The Verdict, directed by Sidney
Lumet and written by David Mamet.388 In the movie, Paul Newman’s
character, an alcoholic lawyer, represents the estate of a female pa384. CHARLES DICKENS, A CHRISTMAS CAROL (Chamberlain Bros. 2005) (1843).
385. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 236 (John W. Strong ed., 4th ed. 1992).
386. Thompson v. State, 488 A.2d 995, 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
387. See, e.g., Equitable Life Assurance Soc’y v. Starr, 489 N.W.2d 857, 862–63 (Neb.
1992) (quoting both of the preceding passages in support of its finding that the opponent
of a duplicate failed to raise a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original).
388. THE VERDICT (20th Century Fox 1982).
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tient who went into a coma during a C-section performed by famous
anesthesiologist, Dr. Towler. The hospital introduces into evidence
the patient’s admission form with the number 9 written on it, which
ostensibly indicated that the patient had eaten nine hours before
admittance.
During direct examination of the nurse who filled out the form,
Newman’s character asks her what the patient told her about when
the patient had eaten. The nurse responds that the patient told her
that she had a full meal one hour before coming to the hospital and
that the nurse accordingly put the number 1 on the form. On crossexamination, defense counsel questions the nurse about her testimony because the original admittance form had the number 9, and
the nurse responds by surprisingly producing a photocopy of the form
with the number 1. The nurse claims:
[A]fter the operation, when that poor girl, she went into a
coma, Dr. Towler called me in. He told me that he had five
difficult deliveries in a row and he was tired and he never
looked at the admittance form. He told me to change the 1
to a 9 or else, or else, he said he would fire me, he said I
would never work again.389
She testifies that she made this change to the form, but not before she
made a photocopy of the original.
Upon defense counsel’s objection, the judge strikes the duplicate
from the record on the ground that “we can’t accept a copy in preference to the original.”390 Despite the judge’s action, however, and despite there being scant other evidence of liability, the jury finds for the
plaintiff, in effect accepting the copy in preference to the original,391
a decision of which the movie clearly approves.
The film created a potential issue, however, which legal authorities were quick to resolve. As noted, under Rule 1003(1), a duplicate is
not admissible to the same extent as an original when there is a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original. Applied literally,
Rule 1003(1) would mean that when the proponent actually produces
an alleged original, and the opponent claims that the original was altered and seeks to prove the alteration by producing an alleged prealteration duplicate, the alleged duplicate would be inadmissible be389. Id.
390. Id.
391. See HILLEL SCHWARTZ, THE CULTURE OF THE COPY: STRIKING LIKENESSES, UNREASONABLE FACSIMILES 243 (1996) (“[T]o the jury in the film [The Verdict] . . . the intact copy takes
precedence over originals.”).
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cause there would be a genuine question as to the authenticity of the
original.
In the wake of The Verdict, evidence authorities thus argued that
the Best Evidence Rule should be interpreted so that when the proponent actually produces an original writing, recording, or photograph,
and the opponent seeks to introduce a duplicate to prove that the
alleged original was altered, the duplicate is admissible, regardless of
the fact that there will inevitably be questions as to the authenticity of
the original in these circumstances. For instance, in his Handbook of
Federal Evidence, Professor Graham noted in his discussion of Rule
1004(1) that “[a]n original that has been altered should be considered destroyed for the purpose of applying the Original Writing Rule.
See the movie entitled ‘The Verdict.’”392 In Mueller and Kirkpatrick’s
Evidence, they wrote:
The literal wording of FRE 1003 creates a potential
anomaly. If the Rule were interpreted to mean that a duplicate must be excluded whenever a genuine question has
been raised concerning the authenticity of the original, the
trier would be deprived of a category of evidence that could
be critical in resolving the question of authenticity. For example, if an opponent claims that the original was altered, a
duplicate made before the alleged alteration is likely to be
the best available evidence to resolve such a challenge. The
objective of the Best Evidence Doctrine is to restrict the introduction of secondary evidence in lieu of the original. That
objective is not violated where one party has already offered
what it claims to be the “original,” and the opposing party
offers a “duplicate” to challenge the authenticity of the purported “original.” Even if FRE 1003(1) were interpreted to
exclude the duplicate in this situation, it could nonetheless
qualify for admission under FRE 1004(1) as “other evidence”
of content in support of a claim that the original has been
“destroyed” through alteration.393
As one commentator has noted, it is obvious that Mueller and Kirkpatrick “had ‘The Verdict’ in mind when discussing th[is] ‘potential
anomaly’ . . . .”394 Courts have fallen in line with these authorities,

392. 3 MICHAEL H. GRAHAM, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 1004.2 n.1 (5th ed.
2001).
393. CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER & LAIRD C. KIRKPATRICK, EVIDENCE § 10.8 (1995).
394. Donald F. Paine, ‘The Verdict’: A fascinating issue concerning the best evidence rule, 32
TENN. B.J. 15, 16 n.1 (1996).
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determining that duplicates are admissible to challenge the authenticity of previously admitted “originals.”395
Conversely, in recent years, popular fiction has reflected society’s
growing concern regarding the ease with which nearly anyone can
quickly and convincingly create forgeries, as can be seen in two of the
most acclaimed television shows of all time.396 In the fourth season
episode “Margin of Error” of HBO’s The Wire, things are coming to a
head in the Baltimore mayoral election between incumbent Clarence
Royce and Councilman Thomas “Tommy” Carcetti.397 After Carcetti
greets potential voters outside Baltimore’s new African-American History Museum, Delegate Odell Watkins hands him a flyer with a photo
depicting Carcetti on the courtroom steps representing a notorious
slumlord in his days as an attorney in private practice. Carcetti claims
that he has never even met the slumlord, and his campaign is eventually able to determine that Carcetti’s head was photoshopped onto
someone else’s body, but not before some damage has been done to
his campaign.398
Meanwhile, the 2003 relaunch of Battlestar Galactica follows a motley fleet of humans trying to find the mythical planet Earth after the
“Cylons,” artificially intelligent robots, complete an attack on their
home planet of Caprica.399 In the first season episode, “Six Degrees
of Separation,” Commander Bill Adama, the military leader of the
humans, is presented with an octagonal CD with a photo taken by
Defense Ministry security cameras on Caprica the day before the attack.400 The photo depicts a man entering the Ministry with a bomb,
and tactical officer Felix Gaeta is eventually able to determine that the
man is future President Gaius Baltar. Over Baltar’s protestations that
the photo is a fake he is sentenced to death. Before the axe falls,
however, Gaeta takes it upon himself to re-run all the security checks
395. See, e.g., John Beaudette, Inc. v. Sentry Ins. A Mut. Co., 94 F. Supp. 2d 77, 136–37
(D. Mass. 1999) (finding that the admission of alleged original insurance policies did not
preclude the opponent from admitting “recreated policies as secondary evidence which
[allegedly] more accurately reflect[ed] the contents of the actual policies”).
396. The Guardian notes that “[t]he Wire is the most critically acclaimed TV programme
in the history of the medium.” Ben Marshall, Getting wired, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 10, 2007,
available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/media/2007/feb/10/broadcasting.tvandradio.
Many critics listed Battlestar Galactica as the best television show in 2005. See, e.g., James
Poniewozik, Best of 2005: Television, TIME, Dec. 16, 2005, available at http://www.time.com/
time/arts/article/0,8599,1141640,00.html.
397. The Wire: Margin of Error (HBO television broadcast Oct. 15, 2006).
398. Id.
399. Battlestar Galactica, http://www.scifi.com/battlestar/about/index.php (last visited
Nov. 17, 2008).
400. Battlestar Galactica: Six Degrees of Separation (SciFi television broadcast Feb. 18, 2005).
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on the photograph and detects markers that point to digital manipulation, leading to Baltar’s exoneration.401
Despite the fears reflected by these shows and the fears expressed
by both the digital forensics community and the CCIPS, courts to this
point have not been responsive and have failed to view challenged
duplicates with any degree of increased skepticism. Indeed, even
when the opponents of duplicates have presented evidence making it
extremely likely that either unintentional technological flaws or intentional manipulation resulted in proffered duplicates not accurately reproducing originals, courts have rejected Rule 1003(1) challenges.
Two clear examples are the Amin court rejecting a Rule 1003(1) challenge to the copy of Kucera’s declaration despite the final page having
printing across the top indicative of a fax while the remaining pages of
the document did not,402 and the Alderson court rejecting a Rule
1003(1) challenge to a copy of a videotape despite the copy being
thirty-five minutes long while the authenticating officer’s police report
described the original videotape as forty-five minutes in length.403
By no means, however, are these the only cases where courts have
rejected Rule 1003(1) challenges despite questionable copies of videotapes404 and facsimiles. For instance, in United States v. Reich,405 the
defendant, Perry Reich was indicted on, inter alia, one count of forgery of a judge’s signature based upon allegedly faxing a fraudulent
judge’s order to the plaintiff’s attorney in a civil case.406 Over Reich’s
objection, the prosecution introduced into evidence an alleged copy
of the facsimile.407 At the purported time of receipt of Reich’s fax,
the facsimile transmission log for the fax machine in the attorney’s
office recorded the receipt of a two-page fax, but the “copy” introduced at trial was four pages long.408
Reich argued under Rule 1003(1) “that because the fax log d[id]
not contain an entry for a four-page fax within the relevant time period, the four-page document at issue could not possibly have been
faxed to [the attorney’s] fax machine.”409 The court rejected this ar401. Id.
402. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
403. See supra note 317–324 and accompanying text.
404. See, e.g., Sera v. State, 17 S.W.3d 61, 81–82 (Ark. 2000) (rejecting a party’s Rule
1003(1) challenge despite expert testimony that the copy of a tape had been edited from
the original).
405. No. 04 CR 587 (NGG), 2005 WL 1388967 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2005).
406. Id. at *1.
407. Id. at *4.
408. Id. at *2.
409. Id. at *4.
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gument, asserting that “page 3 of the forged order contains the
header ‘Extended Page 2.1,’ providing a possible explanation for
th[e] apparent inconsistency.”410 Of course, if the Reich case were being decided under the summary judgment test, this apparent inconsistency would have been fatal, and the court’s “possible explanation”
would have been woefully insufficient to refute the nonmoving party’s
claim.411 Beyond this point, however, the court’s opinion is nonsensical on its own terms. Ostensibly, the court’s “Extended Page 2.1” theory possibly explains why the facsimile transmission log might have
excised one page from the fax, but the alleged four-page fax was recorded as a two-page fax, not a three-page fax.412
One might argue that parties like Reich opposing the admission
of duplicates under Rule 1003(1) on the ground that they failed to
accurately reproduce originals are using the wrong tactic. The argument would be that the proponent of an alleged duplicate must first
prove that the proffered writing, recording, or photograph is an accurate reproduction of the original under Rule 1001(4), meaning that
an opponent such as Reich should claim that the proffered evidence
is not a duplicate, rather than contending that there is a genuine
question as to the authenticity of the original under Rule 1003(1).
The case law, however, does not bear out this argument.
To wit, in Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Rodenberg,413 the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (“FDIC”) brought an action
against Robert Rodenberg, guarantor of notes purchased by the
FDIC.414 The FDIC moved for summary judgment on its action, but it
solely submitted photocopies of the guaranty and promissory note executed by Rodenberg.415 Rodenberg responded that these photocopies were not “duplicates” under Rule 1001(4) because one was
missing margins and the other contained “illegible portions,” including part of his signature.416
The court rejected this argument, finding that “the submitted
documents [we]re accurate copies of the originals.”417 The court
noted that “[d]espite the missing margins and deleted portions, the
terms of the continuing guaranty [we]re clear, since only one, two, or
at most three of the letters of the starting word on each line [we]re
410.
411.
412.
413.
414.
415.
416.
417.

Id.
See supra note 193 and accompanying text.
Reich, 2005 WL 1388967, at *2.
571 F. Supp. 455 (D. Md. 1983).
Id. at 456.
Id. at 457.
Id. at 457–58.
Id. at 458.
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omitted, and . . . only one reasonable interpretation c[ould] be given
to the language used.”418 Furthermore, the court concluded that only
part of the defendant’s signature and witness’s name were illegible,
negating the Rule 1001(4) challenge and precluding any challenge
under Rule 1003(2) that the duplicate failed to reproduce important
parts of the original.419
Of course, the Maryland Court of Special Appeals indicated that
scribe copies were inadmissible because of the possibility that an anxious Bob Cratchit “might distractedly misplace a decimal point, invert
a pair of digits or drop a line.”420 The court contended that mechanically produced duplicates have been deemed admissible because “[a]
Xerox machine, by way of contrast, does not worry about Tiny Tim
and does not, therefore, misplace decimal points, invert digits, drop
lines, or suffer any of the other mental lapses that flesh is heir to.”421
The problem with this analysis is two-fold. First, despite the court’s
claims, modern copying technologies such as fax machines, “sometimes skip lines, paragraphs, or even entire pages during the transmission process.”422 Second, even with modern copying technologies,
there is still a person performing the copying,423 leading to the possibility that the copy will be incomplete and misinterpreted. And yet, as
the Rodenberg case makes clear, even when parties have presented
courts with the certainty that copies missed margins and deleted portions of originals, courts have deemed the copies “duplicates” under
Rule 1001(4).
Courts have largely fallen in line with Rodenberg, finding that alleged copies qualify as “duplicates,” even when proponents have acknowledged that proffered copies were altered versions of originals.
For instance, in Rojas v. State,424 the Court of Appeals of Texas found
that an “enhanced” copy of a surveillance tape was a “duplicate”
under Texas Rule of Evidence 1001(d) (the identical version of Federal Rule of Evidence 1001(4)) despite the copy amplifying the voices
from the original tape.425 As support for this conclusion, the court
cited to two previous cases where the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
deemed copies of tapes “duplicates” under Rule 1001(d) despite the
418. Id.
419. Id.
420. Thompson v. State, 488 A.2d 995, 1006 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1985).
421. See id.
422. Thomas, supra note 35, at 1157.
423. Cf. John M. Burman, High Tech Ethics, Part I, 23 WYO. LAW. 14, 15 (2000) (“Because
humans are involved in sending and receiving faxes, errors will occur . . . .”).
424. No. 14-99-00190-CR, 2000 WL 703011 (Tex. App. June 1, 2000).
425. Id. at *2–3.
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copies reducing and removing background noise from the originals.426 From these cases, the Court of Appeals of Texas drew the
principle that Rule 1001(d) “does not necessarily require an identical
reproduction . . . only an accurate one.”427
While Rojas and the cases cited therein involved government officials editing originals to create copies, courts have even found that
alleged copies admittedly altered by private parties can constitute
“duplicates” under Rule 1001(4). In State v. Smith,428 the Court of Appeals of Washington considered the appeal of Shawn Smith, who allegedly shot and killed his stepfather, and was recorded admitting to
the murder on friend Robert Levitt’s telephone answering machine.429 Levitt admittedly transferred the conversation from the answering machine microcassette to another cassette.430 According to
Levitt, he deliberately erased portions of the conversation “to protect
other parties implicated by the conversation.”431 Nonetheless, over
Smith’s objection, the trial court found that the cassette copy was a
“duplicate” under Rule 1001(4), and the Court of Appeals of Washington affirmed.432
The court noted that there were “character deficiencies in Mr.
Levitt’s background that relate to his credibility,” yet it failed to list
these deficiencies.433 The court also indicated that Levitt owed Smith
money and that he was afraid of him.434 The court, however, noted
that the trial court found that, “although Levitt was confused at times
about some details, he was credible regarding this particular telephone conversation and his actions in recording it and re-recording it
and his reasons for giving the tape to law enforcement.”435 The court
then deferred to this credibility determination and found that the cassette was a “duplicate” despite the erased portions because (1) according to Levitt, the deleted portions were not important to the issue of
Smith’s guilt, ostensibly eliminating any Rule 1003(2) challenge, and
(2) because “the remaining segments of the tape were . . . accurate
426. Id. at *3 (citing Angleton v. State, 971 S.W.2d 65, 67–68 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998);
Narvaiz v. State, 840 S.W.2d 415, 431 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992)).
427. Id. at *2.
428. No. 39746-0-I, 1999 WL 713838 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 13, 1999).
429. Id. at *1.
430. Id.
431. Id.
432. Id.
433. Id. at *2.
434. Id. at *1–2.
435. Id. at *2. Of course, if the court were applying the summary judgment standard, it
would not have been entitled to make this credibility determination in favor of the proponent. See supra notes 222–223 and accompanying text.
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reproductions of the original . . . .”436 It then concluded that although “the duplicate did not reproduce the original in its entirety,”
it was still an accurate reproduction.437 Such reasoning is directly antithetical to Professor Cleary’s claim in Rule 1003’s legislative history
that a duplicate’s apparent lack of completeness should be a factor
making it more likely that there is a genuine question as to the authenticity of the original.438
B. Duplicates: Even Better Than the Real Thing
Courts’ reluctance to grant Rule 1003(1) challenges to the point
of rendering the exception meaningless and their concurrent unwillingness to find that proffered copies failed to accurately reproduce
originals under Rule 1001(4) has not merely rendered duplicates the
equivalent of originals for authentication purposes; it has made them
even better than the real thing. This is because, as Professors Cleary
and Strong noted in 1981, “[a]s to authenticity . . . the original may
possess physical characteristics of the highest importance which no
copying process can reproduce.”439 And while such concerns about
the opponents of duplicates being able to detect forgeries and alterations were undoubtedly present with the copying technology available
in the 1980s, forgeries today can be produced that are indistinguishable from originals and leave no visual cues of having been tampered
with, placing the opponents of duplicates at an even greater competitive disadvantage.440
There is, however, some hope on the horizon. Last October, in
State v. Brown,441 the Supreme Court of Minnesota rejected a Rule
1003(1) challenge to a digital copy of a surveillance tape, but it made
some promising statements in dicta. It noted that it understood that
when copies are made using modern technologies, “there is the risk of
manipulation or distortion, particularly with digitization . . . .”442 The
court then echoed a CCIPS recommendation,443 contending:
[P]rosecutors should be on notice that the trial court has
broad discretion to exclude digital copies if defense counsel
is not provided with adequate notice and opportunity either
436.
437.
438.
439.
440.
441.
442.
443.

Id. at *5.
Id.
See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
EDWARD W. CLEARY & JOHN W. STRONG, FEDERAL EVIDENCE 388 (1981).
See supra note 371 and accompanying text.
739 N.W.2d 716 (Minn. 2007).
Id. at 723.
See supra note 383 and accompanying text.
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to observe the conversion process or retain an independent
expert to make a similar conversion or, in the alternative, to
allow the court to arrange for supervision of the process.444
C. Conclusion
At the time that the Supreme Court enacted Rule 1003 in 1975,
courts thought that modern copying technologies eliminated the possibility of human error and largely obviated concerns about fraud in
the duplication process. There is, however, a growing recognition of
the ease with which material can be quickly and convincingly manipulated by nearly anyone. Yet, while both scientific and legal authorities
have argued that we must change the way that duplicates are authenticated, courts have not yet taken heed.
V. CONCLUSION
When the Supreme Court decided to treat mechanically created
duplicates as largely admissible to the same extent as originals under
Rule 1003, it made sure to create a clear exception to that Rule when
the opposing party raised a genuine question as to the authenticity of
the original. Even though the language of Rule 1003 closely resembles the language used in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)(2),
courts have required a greater evidentiary showing by parties opposing duplicates than by parties opposing motions for summary judgment. Why, then, do courts almost never find that opponents raise
genuine questions as to the authenticity of originals under Rule
1003(1) and yet frequently find that opponents raise genuine issues
for trial under Rule 56(e)(2)?
Surely, it is not the legislative history behind Rule 1003, which
indicates (1) that the House Committee on the Judiciary approved the
Rule “with the expectation that the courts would be liberal in deciding
that a ‘genuine question is raised as to the authenticity of the original,’”445 and (2) that Professor Edward Cleary, the Chief Reporter for
the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence, claimed
that “[t]he party complaining of lack of opportunity to see the original would . . . find in the exceptions of Rule 1003 any protection
which the circumstances justified.”446 And just as surely, it is not the
developments in copying technology since the Rule was enacted in
444. Brown, 739 N.W.2d at 723.
445. H.R. REP. NO. 93-650, at 17 (1973).
446. Cleary Letter, supra note 275.
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1975, which have made it so that nearly anyone can quickly create a
fairly compelling forgery.
Instead, everything about the way that duplicates are currently
admitted points to the conclusion that courts need to be more liberal
in finding genuine questions raised as to the authenticity of originals
under Rule 1003(1) rather than interpreting this exception in a manner that renders it meaningless. Yet, while both scientific and legal
authorities argue that we must change the way that duplicates are authenticated, courts have yet to act accordingly. Hopefully, courts will
soon pay attention and more readily find duplicates inadmissible
under Rule 1003(1) rather than treating them as even better than the
real thing.

